Reykjavík Grapevine - 04.05.2012, Blaðsíða 22

Reykjavík Grapevine - 04.05.2012, Blaðsíða 22
Many people speak of China and Ice- land as if China’s interest in Iceland is only a few years old. This belief is forgivable—most China/Iceland rela- tions have been decidedly low-key, with two recent exceptions: former Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s 2002 visit, during which members of Falun Gong—both visiting and local—were de- tained by police to prevent them from protesting his arrival, and more recently Chinese businessman Huang Nubo’s interest in buying land in Iceland last year, which sparked much controversy amongst Icelanders. In fact, relations between the two countries go back quite a ways—Ice- land and China established diplomatic relations in 1971. “Before that there were no formal relations between the governments of the two countries,” Magnús Björnsson, a lecturer at the University of Iceland who specializes in China studies, told The Grapevine. “The Icelandic Chinese Cultural Soci- ety (KÍM) was established in 1953, and through that a window was opened into China. Earlier contacts were only through personal connections includ- ing Icelandic missionaries going to China, beginning in the 1920s.” So the two countries are not exactly strangers to each other. Falun Gong, Amnesty Internation- al and others have taken issue with China’s human rights record, and MP for The Movement Þór Saari made it a point to ask Foreign Minister Össur Skarphéðinsson in parliament if he planned to discuss human rights with the premier, to which the minister re- plied, "I consider it quite certain that at some point during the visit human rights will be discussed." But what has made many more Icelanders nervous about China’s interest in Iceland has less to do with human rights than it does with China’s presence in Iceland. SUSPICIOUS MINDS Icelanders’ concerns over China’s presence in Iceland became apparent in 2011, when Chinese businessman Huang Nubo offered to pay 1 billion ISK for land in Grímsstaðir á Fjöllum. Encompassing 30,639 hectares in northeast Iceland, it is a place of natu- ral beauty located near the mountain Herðubreið, and a popular camping spot. The fact that the area is naturally pristine and his intention was to build a luxury hotel and golf course on the land set off a great deal of public outrage. Matters weren’t helped when it came to light that he had personal contacts with numerous members of the Social Dem- ocratic Party in Iceland, which leads Iceland’s current coalition government. Diligent Icelandic bloggers dug up some more dirt on Huang Nubo—in par- ticular that one of his companies, Bei- jing Zhongdian Investment Corp, was in the business of cheating rural Chinese out of their land for use in tourism, and that his resume includes working with- in the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China. Ultimately, Huang Nubo was denied permission to buy land in Iceland, as The Ministry of the Interior pointed out that Icelandic law prohibits non-Scandinavians from buying land here. Only days ago, it was brought to light that municipalities of northern and eastern Iceland intend to create a shareholding company, buy a 70% share of the property, and then lease it to Huang Nubo over the next 40 years. He has already paid the full amount in advance. As a result of this very recent con- troversy, many Icelanders regarded the arrival of Wen Jiabao with suspicion. What does China want with Iceland? And why is Iceland trying so hard to build a relationship with China? “Iceland needs trading partners and China is a good one—providing all kinds of goods to Icelanders, most at agree- able prices,” Magnús says. “In the fu- ture, China can also become one of the most important markets for Icelandic exports like fish and tourism. Iceland can be important to China by providing techniques for harnessing geothermal energy, which is abundant in China but has not been utilised to any degree so far. This is very important as China is taking steps toward more green en- ergy. China also needs Iceland as a strategic partner in the Arctic region when the Trans-Arctic shipping route becomes an option in transportation and for future utilisation of natural re- sources in the Arctic. In that field, the benefits should be for both parties.” This last point is an important one. China is the world’s largest energy con- sumer, and the United States Geologi- cal Survey estimates that around 13% of the world's undiscovered oil reserves and at least 30% of its gas are buried under the Arctic Ocean. Also, around 46% of the Chinese gross national product is linked to shipping, according to the Journal of Energy and Security. Melting Arctic ice, and the opening of new shipping lanes, would be quite a boon to China. But getting access to the region isn’t easy—to get to the Arctic, China needs to get through the Arctic Council first. The Arctic Council is an organisation comprised of Iceland, Denmark, Nor- way, Sweden, Canada, Russia, and the US. Founded in 1996, the Arctic Council is the gatekeeper of the Arctic—its fo- cus is primarily on environmental pro- tection and sustainable development of the region. Any country that wants to do business in the region, whether exploring for oil or building bases of op- erations, must get the unanimous ap- proval of the Arctic Council members. With everything China has to gain in the Arctic—and every vote on the coun- cil needed for any kind of development in the region—it’s small wonder China should be courting Iceland. The Chinese embassy’s political office responded to the Grapevine in predictably nebulous fashion, saying, “Iceland and China are good friends and partners. In the future we expect to enhance mutual trust, increase trade and promote people-to-people friendly contact. Both sides could enhance their cooperation in a number of fields, in- cluding: geothermal development both What does China want with Iceland, anyway? Friends With Benefits Chinese Premier Wen jiabao came to Iceland last month. Arriving with an entourage of about 100 people, he was greeted by Prime Minister jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, and would later meet with many other government ministers. He was given a brief tour of the countryside and met with the president. While this would seem par for the course of any visiting world leader, Wen jiabao did not just come to check out Gullfoss and Geysir—China and Iceland signed six agreements that could have a profound impact on Iceland’s future, and also reflect China’s growing interest in the polar region. By Paul Fontaine
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