Reykjavík Grapevine - 07.01.2011, Blaðsíða 10

Reykjavík Grapevine - 07.01.2011, Blaðsíða 10
10 The Reykjavík Grapevine Issue 1 — 2011 The First Decade Of The 21st Century In Retrospect | Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson was leader of the Icelandic Social-Democratic Party from 1984-96 and Minister of Finance and Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade from 1987-95. He is an honorary citizen of Vilnius, Lithuania. Will October 6th, 2008 (the day Iceland’s luckless PM Mr. Haarde, asked God to help his poor nation since he himself could not) live on in our collective memory as a “day of infamy”—a sort of Icelandic Pearl Harbour? Pearl Harbour is today remembered by Americans because of Japan’s aerial bombardment on the US naval station. And because it led to the Americans' involvement in the Second World War. Wars are inevitably both destabilising and devastating. People not only lose their property—but their lives. In our case, Iceland’s economic col- lapse (“hrunið”) may yet claim a few lives, but in most cases the losses are less tangible. Many have lost their jobs, their property, their savings. Some have even lost their hope. Then there are those who have already voted with their feet—and emigrated. Some say our greatest loss is our reputation as an honest and trustwor- thy people. Because in our case, we did not suffer an attack from an outside en- emy. In our case the enemy came from within. That is what makes it all the more painful. And it explains, partly at least, why so many find it almost un- bearable to face the truth: We have only ourselves to blame—and no one else. ‘THE THREE WISE MEN’ The best thing that has happened to us after the crash is the truth-com- mission-report by ‘the three wise men’. Nine volumes and almost three thousand pages, including appended documents on the web. The truth and nothing but the truth. They were asked to tell us the truth about the causes of the collapse and to find out who was responsible. And they did just that— fairly and squarely. They spelled it all out in painstaking detail. The collapse was caused by a combi- nation of fraudulent business schemes and irresponsible politicians. And by the way: the majority of Icelandic voters cannot be acquitted either. Time and again they voted for parties and politi- cians who did not deserve the trust put in them. Again and again. And the nou- veaux riche buffoons—flaunting their ill-begotten wealth—were extolled as the nation’s best sons. How many times did the President of Iceland, Mr. Gríms- son—the hyper-active chef-de-protocol of the plutocrats—ceremoniously ac- cord them the highest decorations of state, making it impossible for honest people to accept such commendations in the future? The critics’ voices were simply drowned, and the warning sig- nals—and there were plenty of them— were ignored. No wonder how many are simply unable to face the truth: Out of 147 individuals in leading positions in gov- ernment, political parties, the Central Bank, the civil service and banks and business corporations etc., questioned by the truth-commission, not a single one admitted any responsibility at all, not to mention expressing a sense of guilt or regret. “Not my department” was the standard refrain of those haughty elitists. This seems to be a na- tion where the blind lead the deaf. But ours was not only the lethal cocktail of dishonest business and incompetent politics. Iceland was by design meant to become a shining ex- ample of the neo-conservative utopia; a tax haven for the super-rich with mini- mum government interference in the free play of market forces. If something were to go astray, the market forces could be trusted to correct it by them- selves—or so they believed. This was not only the professed ideology of the Independence Party leadership; it was the declared policy of the IP-led govern- ments that steered us, slowly but surely, into the crash. Iceland’s fall in 2008 was the di- rect consequence of this pre-meditated policy. It was not the failure of capital- ism as such. Capitalism cannot func- tion at all without direction, legislation and constant supervision by the state. It was the US-style predatory type of capitalism, let loose without proper democratic control that failed here as elsewhere. The biggest lesson to be learned from this catastrophic experi- ment is simply this: never again. Never again should we let the selfish, greedy and short-sighted have a chance to play whimsically with our fortune. Now, my countrymen must find their way back to the Nordic family of nations, with their democratic and egalitarian way of life, or else face social disintegration. THE NEO-CON UTOPIA The ‘three wise men’, in their volu- minous investigative report, amassed unassailable evidence for how the mis- taken policies of the Independence Party-led governments after the 1999 elections gradually brought Iceland towards the brink of the abyss. It all began with the practice—contrary to the law of the land—to allow a selected group of ship-owners to sell or rent their fishing quotas (allowable catch), which had been allotted to them by the state—for free. Thus the most valuable natural resource of the nation, actually a national property under the law, was in practice privatised. It was handed out to politically favoured groups of ship-owners—for free. This was very much in the same way as Russia’s rich resources of oil and gas were given to a favoured few, in return for political sup- port. This sort of blatant abuse of power could never have been thinkable in a decent democratic state like Norway, for example, with its enormous oil wealth. The privatisation of the state-owned banks to politically favoured groups of businessmen was pushed through in much the same way by the leaders of the Independence Party and their part- ners. In a few years time, those tradi- tional commercial banks, which had tended to the needs of the local commu- nity, had been turned into international investment banks (some say more like aggressive hedge-funds), amassing mountains of foreign-currency denom- inated debt, through easy credit abroad. In four years (2003–2006) they had piled up debt to the tune of ten times Iceland’s GDP. Behind it, for ultimate support if need be, were the meagre foreign currency reserves of the Ice- landic Central Bank and ultimately Ice- land’s tax-payer base of 220 thousand individuals (less than a common small town anywhere in Europe). This was fi- nancial madness. In the end Iceland’s nouveaux riche banksters proved the truth of William Black's dictum: “The best way to rob a bank is to own a bank.” This ideologically conceived and utterly reckless experiment with the fate of a nation was doomed from the start. Why didn't the government act in time to avert a foreseeable calamity? The simple answer is: In the thinking of the Independence Party leaders and their cohorts, this was not a mistake to be corrected. On the contrary this was declared policy to be promoted. As late of 2007 it was the official policy of the Independence Party/Alliance’s coali- tion government to enhance the finan- cial sector’s position as Iceland’s engine of growth. According to the evidence presented in the investigative report, the IP-lead governments (1999-2009) turned out to be amazingly incompetent. Instead of restraining the banks’ expansion and lending capacity, they enhanced it, resulting in a classical real-estate bubble. Instead of applying the brakes, to rein in debt-based overspending, the government stepped on the accelera- tor, by drastic tax-cuts for the benefit of the rich. The Central Bank’s monetary policy was, according to the report, both misconceived and ineffective. Because of Iceland’s automatic indexing of long- term loans (with a fixed rate of inter- est) to the CPI (consumer price index); and because of the easy access to cheap credit abroad, steep rises in the rate of interest were not only ineffective but counter-productive. It attracted speculative capital, seek- ing quick profits from interest-rate differentials, with disastrous conse- quences. It strengthened the króna, enhanced imports, pushed the trade deficit into world record figures and helped pile up unsustainable debt. Long before the fall, Iceland’s economy had spiralled out of control and was heading helplessly for a harsh landing. The US-originated financial crisis was just the spark that ignited the f lame. In the words of the renowned financial ex- pert, Willem Buiter, Iceland’s fall was “not a question of if – only when”. When ultimately Iceland met its fate, this once egalitarian Nordic na- tion had, by the impact of grisly ideol- ogy and shortsighted and irresponsible politics, been turned into a caricature of US-style casino capitalism. Thus Ice- land, which was meant to be a shining example of the neo-con model’s supe- riority, became the first victim of its ultimate global failure. The intellectual legacy of Reagan-Thatcher and their disciples has by now been relegated to the “dustbin of history”. Unfortu- nately, that is also Iceland’s place in the world—for the time being. BROKEN TOOLS Who is to come to the rescue? How are we to find our way back to normalcy (after this mad ride as the “sorcerer’s apprentice”)? That’s the point. We are broke (as a nation) and by definition unable to help ourselves. We need out- side help. And willingly or not, we have now been placed under the tutelage of the IMF—the first “developed” nation since the UK in 1976 to be given that treatment. The IMF is the watchdog of Ameri- can capitalism. It is there to ensure that the interests of international capital are duly taken into account when na- tion states threaten to default. Since we are broke and already over our head in debt, we don’t have the option of pump- ing public money into the economy to stimulate economic activity. Therefore we have no choice but to accept the bit- ter pill of the imposed austerity pro- gram. We must cut our budgetary ex- penditure on welfare and raise taxes to save enough money to pay our debt. We must claw our way back out of the debt prison. Can we do it? That is the ques- tion. To tell the truth, the prospects don’t look too bright. He who is unable to ad- mit his mistakes is by the same token unable to correct them. He is therefore doomed to repeat them. That seems to be the most likely outcome for the time being. When it comes to political solu- tions—learning from our mistakes— the only tools (the political parties) we have for the job, are broken. Three of the parties (The IP, the awkwardly named Alliance—for what?) and the so called Progressives, are all to a vary- ing degree discredited by their past and compromised by their inability to admit their failure of leadership. Who can trust them? And if they cannot be trusted—who can replace them? Do we need another bout of the “pots and pans” revolution? The Left-Greens, although clear of any responsibility for the crash and called upon to clean up the mess left there by the others, are caught unpre- pared for the task of charting any fu- ture course for the nation. Their mis- conceived antipathy for the European Union and general economic illitera- cy—despite the heroic stamina of their chairman, turned Finance Minister— makes the party an awkward and unre- liable coalition partner. So, the question remains unanswered: Who can ride in for the rescue and stake out the road to salvation? Although ‘the three wise men’, in their investigative report, gave con- To Be Or Not To Be A Republic At A Crossroads </2010 POLITICS> “He who does not acknowledge his mistakes and blames everybody else for his own faults is not going to learn from those mistakes. He is doomed to repeat them. Sorry.” “The fall of 2008 has mercilessly disclosed the underlying weaknesses of the young Icelandic republic. Not only is it still today unable to defend itself against potential outside aggressors. But what about enemies from within?” Words Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson Photography Julia Staples

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