Reykjavík Grapevine - 12.08.2011, Qupperneq 10

10
The Reykjavík Grapevine
Issue 12 — 2011
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If you've taken even the most cur-
sory glance at recent Icelandic his-
tory, chances are you're familiar
with the Cod Wars: big, bad Britain
sends warships up against plucky
little Iceland's fishing boats, and the
underdog wins. But the incident was
hardly a fluke. Norwegian author Ja-
cob Børresen, in his new book, ‘Tor-
skekrig! Om forutsetninger og ram-
mer for kyststatens bruk av makt’
(“Cod War! The conditions and limits
for the coastal state’s use of force”),
explains that small nations actually
have more power at their disposal
than many would suspect. We called
him up for some tips on how we
might abuse this power....
Do you think the Cod War had any
international implications? Did the
world theatre, with regards to rela-
tions between large and small na-
tions, change as a result of it?
No. The Cod Wars took place within
the framework of the Cold War and was
solved without upsetting that framework,
i.e. Iceland did not leave NATO. There are
no traces, as far as I can see, of the Cod
Wars in international relations. On the
other hand, the Cod Wars were an ex-
pression of a new paradigm after World
War II and the creation of the U.N. and
the prohibition of war in the U.N. Pact,
where there were stronger political lim-
its for major powers' use of force against
minor powers, and thus more room for
minor powers to manoeuvre. I doubt that
Iceland could have succeeded, let's say,
50 years earlier.
FIRST WE TOOK THEIR COD...
Tell us a little something about your
theory of small states and the use of
power.
My key concept is "The balance of per-
ceived interests." When the issue under
dispute is much more important to Na-
tion A in a conflict than to Nation B, the
balance of perceived interests is in fa-
vour of Nation A. My proposition is that
when the balance of perceived interests
is in favour of the small state, it tends to
cancel out the balance of power in favour
of its bigger adversary, creating wiggle
room for the small state that otherwise
would not have been there. In the Cod
Wars, national control of the fish re-
sources around Iceland was a question
of vital, almost existential, proportions for
Iceland, while in Britain it affected only
a few communities. The development of
the international law of the sea was in
line with the Icelandic point of view. The
Icelandic people and Iceland's govern-
ment stood squarely behind the Icelandic
claims, while the British government was
split on the issue, and the British popula-
tion at large was indifferent. All in all, this
led up to the balance of perceived inter-
ests being decisively in Iceland's favour.
As a result, it was not politically possible
for the British government to use the
amount of force that it had at its disposal
and that had been necessary to break
Iceland's will.
My other major point is that both the
value of the interest under dispute, and
the balance of power between the par-
ties to the dispute, are subjective factors
that can be manipulated. The party to the
conflict who succeeds in communicating
to the opposition that the issue under dis-
pute is a key issue of vital importance to
him, and more important to him than to
his adversary, has succeeded in tipping
the balance of perceived interest in his
favour. An issue that immediately may
upset the balance of perceived interests
in favour of the small state, however, is
if it conducts itself in a way that triggers
the prestige of the larger state. Prestige
was part of the reason why Great Britain
resorted to the Navy in the Cod Wars, but
in this case the balance of perceived in-
terests was so firmly in Iceland's favour
that in the end it did not matter.
THEN WE GRAB THEIR MONEY...
This naturally leads us to talk about
Icesave. Do you think your theory ap-
plies to the Icesave situation?
I am not very well acquainted with Ic-
esave, but in principle the theory of the
balance of perceived interests is appli-
cable to any conflict.
One of the big concerns that the
anti-EU camp in Iceland has is that
as a small nation, they will not have
the kind of sway that countries like
France or Germany might have within
the organisation. How would you re-
spond to this?
Again, I think that in questions of vital im-
portance to Iceland, and that are of more
marginal importance to the other EU
members, Iceland will be able to "punch
above her weight." Fisheries come in this
category, and it strengthens Iceland's
position that many of the EU nations, in
principle, share Iceland's concerns about
a sustainable takeout of fish resources.
A key point when it comes to the dem-
onstration of commitment and resolve
of a small state to uphold and protect a
key interest (which then—by definition—
makes it a key interest), is what I have
called "a strong home base."
US AND WHOSE ARMY?
I suppose one of the more obvious
vulnerabilities of a small nation is the
military one. With a small military—
or, in Iceland's case, no military at
all—what recourse do small nations
have when it comes to self-defence?
I am not so concerned about the military
as such, as I am with the power at the
disposal of the state in general. Iceland
has a renowned Coast Guard, it has valu-
able natural resources, it has debt that its
debtors would like to see repaid—which
is also a source of power—and it is a
sovereign state, member of the U.N. and
NATO, which are also not insignificant
sources of power. Finally, to repeat myself,
a united people behind its government is
not an insignificant source of power in
itself. I talk in my book about the value,
even the necessity, to small nations of al-
liances, formal or informal. Another form
of defence is, of course, to make oneself
so insignificant that nobody would have
any conceivable interest in mingling in
ones affairs. Iceland is not there. The bot-
tom line is that even if Iceland spent all
its resources on military defence it would
not be enough to protect it from a dedi-
cated aggressor. It therefore has to use
its other power resources with that much
more skill.
Is what ways is it good for small na-
tions to join up with larger interna-
tional organisations, and in what
ways could it be detrimental?
Small nations, that are not invisible be-
cause they are totally insignificant, can-
not survive unless they are able to mo-
bilise some kind of external support. That
does not mean that E.U. membership is
necessarily or automatically a good thing
for Iceland. A small state member of a
large international organisation domi-
nated by major powers is dependent on
skilful diplomacy to be able to take care
of her interests. Again, a strong home
base in the form of a people united be-
hind its government can be an asset. On
the other hand, a government in a weak
parliamentarian position at home may
also play that weakness to its favour by
telling the international organisation that
it is unable to do this or that, because it
would create a political crisis at home, or
tell the home audience that it is unable to
do this or that because of its formal obli-
gations to the organisation. There are no
straight answers to questions like these.
THE LUxURIOUS MORAL HIGH
CHAIR
On a global scale, do you believe
we're trending towards larger na-
tions, or are we moving more to-
wards "balkanisation", i.e., larger na-
tions splitting into smaller ones?
Hard to say. There seems to be a develop-
ment toward multiple competing centres
of power in the world (Beijing, Washing-
ton, Delhi, Brasilia, Moscow, Berlin, Paris,
London). At the same time, the U.N. is in
trouble, apparently incapable of renew-
ing itself. It is still a reflection of the power
equation that resulted from World War II.
Important states do not have a seat in the
Security Council. Consequently, we see
the growth of a number of competing
organisations like the G8, G20, the IMF,
the Arctic Council and so forth. Small
states like Iceland (or Norway for that
matter) are completely dependent for
their security that major powers respect
the prohibition of war in the U.N. Charter.
In that regard, developments of concepts
like "responsibility to protect" and the
increasing willingness of major powers
to use military force as an instrument of
diplomacy, is worrisome.
What role do you see small nations
playing in the global stage in the near
future?
Small states have in common that they
usually have no colonial past, and rela-
tively few heavy international security
obligations. They can therefore enjoy the
luxury of taking the moral high chair in
a lot of questions like human rights, nu-
clear weapons, peace and so forth, and
allow themselves to discuss such issues
on a purely ideal and principal basis. As
such they constitute a resource of in-
sights and knowledge that major states
can tap into as and when they feel the
need. Secretary Generals of the U.N., for
example, often come from small states,
and that is not a coincidence.
Small | Mice
How small nations have more inf luence than you might think
The Mouse That Roared
“Small states have in common that they usually have no
colonial past, and relatively few heavy international security
obligations”
Expansion of the Icelandic Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

internal waters 4 nmi 12 nmi 50 nmi 200 nmi
Words
Paul Fontaine
Illustration
Kjallakr at en.wikipedia