Reykjavík Grapevine


Reykjavík Grapevine - 10.11.2017, Blaðsíða 12

Reykjavík Grapevine - 10.11.2017, Blaðsíða 12
See You This Time Next Year! The seemingly impossible task of forming a government The time between the collapse of Ice- land’s government and election day, while technically only being a little over a month long, felt like a year. Interna- tional media, their attention already on Iceland due to the scandals surround- ing former (and possibly future) Prime Minister Bjarni B e n e d i k t s s o n , speculated that Iceland’s next gov- ernment would be leftist. Surely this time, many report- ers posited, these scandals would be too much for the nation to bear. It should be time’s up for the Indepen- dence Party, right? The results of the elections how- ever, present a problem that appears insurmountable: forming a functional government comprised of two parties. Iceland had seldom had a problem with this area, but it has happened before. Understanding the past will help us plot how we may get out of this crisis presently. Scandal after scandal To start with, our current situation be- gan in April 2016, when the Panama Pa- pers scandal forced then-Prime Minis- ter Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson to resign from office. At the time, the co- alition was comprised of the Progres- sive Party and the Independence Party. The decision taken at the time was to hold early elections that autumn. Par- ties kicked into campaign mode, and a new party, the Reform Party, began to raise enough support to win seats. When all was said and done, the addi- tion of this new party led to a situation whereby no two-party coalitions were possible. What followed was weeks of coalition talks, where even a five-party coalition was attempted, but in the end we ended up with three: Bright Future, the Reform Party, and the Indepen- dence Party leading the government. Their coalition majority was only one seat. This was already a recipe for di- saster. Matters weren’t helped when the “restored honour” scandal broke, which prompted Bright Future to end their part- nership with the other two parties less than a year into the term. Bjarni decided that new elections should be held, but this time, the campaign season shrank from a few months to a few weeks. Fur- ther complicating matters was the fact that a new party, the People’s Party, which had their sights set on municipal elections next year, and was formed in the wake of the Panama Papers, were at the time poll- ing high enough to win parliamentary seats, and Sigmundur decided within days of the government’s collapse to form his own party, quickly sopping up support. Elections came and went, and once again, no two-party coalition could be formed, but possible three- party coalitions seemed to be a long- shot at best. Are you seeing a pattern here? The decision to hold elections The common thread in this is com- prised of three elements: scandal, new parties, and the decision to hold elections within a very short span of time. Nothing can, or should, be done to prevent the creation of new parties; they are symptoms of the scandals that plague the more established parties on the right. The scandals themselves could be prevented—or at the very least, their impact reduced—by remov- ing parties from power that become as- sociated with them. That brings us to the problem with early elections after a very short campaign season. As unlikely as it may seem, we do not actually need to hold new elections just because a government falls apart. In fact, shortly after Bright Future left the previous coalition, the Pirate Party suggested that the parliamentary par- ties simply go into coalition talks and try to form a new government without holding elections. For whatever rea- son, this idea was ignored; early elec- tions were to be held and, given the fact that the government collapsed in the beginning of the parliamentary session, campaigning would have to be drastically shortened (remember that the Panama Papers scandal broke as the spring session was ending). Learning from the past With new parties created in the wake of scandal, followed by a brief but intense campaign, the results of the elections are unsurprising. Now we’re faced with the prospect of another weak, multi- party coalition, possibly setting the stage for yet another government cri- sis. We should keep in mind, though, that Iceland has been through this be- fore. From the time of Iceland’s indepen- dence in 1944, up until 1959, Iceland went through seven governments, none of which lasted four years. Cri- sis popped up again between 1987 and 1991, during which time Iceland had four governments. From there, we had a period of relative stability that lasted until the financial crash of 2008, which led to the government collapsing the following year. So the fact that we have had four government in as many years since is not the worst we’ve ever faced. And we may be able to break the cur- rent cycle, but it would involve doing things much differently in the case that the newly formed government falls apart again. Going forward Should another coalition breakdown happen, and we’re unfortunate enough that it occurs in the beginning or mid- dle of a parliamentary session, it ought to be clear by now that snap elections are not going to solve our problems. Every attempt should be made to try and hold new coalition talks before concluding that new elections need to be held. If it is decided that elections are to be held, then we need a real cam- paign season. Campaign seasons, in a parliamen- tary system, must be long enough for all contenders to be able to run solid campaigns; that is, where parties are afforded a longer period of time to hold debates, and where voters are given a longer period of time to deliberate on the issues once the dust has settled from scandals, rather than be bom- barded with attack ads on social me- dia. In order to allow for a long enough campaign season, we may have to hold our noses and accept either a minority government or even a national unity government in the interim. Those op- tions are not ideal, but they function just fine in emergency situations, at least for as long as it takes to get prop- erly set up for the next elections. Having a stable, functional govern- ment is important in a parliamentary system. More important still is being able to deal with crises effectively, as they can and will happen. If we are to avoid having to go through this year after year, we have to use all the tools at our disposal to deal with them. But reducing the frequency of crisis in the first place means keeping parties from power that are magnets for scandal, and this, for better or for worse, is up to the Icelandic voters to make happen. The power to vote comes from being able to make an informed decision— something snap elections make diffi- cult at best. Words: Paul Fontaine Photo: Art Bicnick ANALYSIS Why can’t these people get their act together? “Understand- ing the past will help us plot how we may get out of this crisis.” 12 The Reykjavík Grapevine Issue 20 — 2017 What Are The Possible Coalitions? Since talks broke down between the Left-Greens, Social Democrats, Pirates and Progressives, on confusing pretexts, we have a few possibilities: Three Party Coalitions Parties: The Independence Party, the Left-Greens and the Social Democrats or the Independence Party, the Progressives, and either the Centre Party or the Social Democrats. Chances? The first one would be a real long shot; the Left-Greens and the Independence Party could not be more different from one another. The second one stands a better chance, especially with the Social Democrats in the mix; Progressive Chair Sigurður Ingi Jóhannsson has expressed unwillingness to participate in a right wing government, and Sigmundur Davíð’s Centre Party are not exactly on the best of terms with the Progressives. Four Party Coalitions Parties: The Left-Greens, The Social Democrats, The Pirates, The People’s Party and the Reform Party. Chances? Since Left-Green chair Katrín Jakobsdóttir returned the mandate to the President after the first formal talks broke down, we will likely not be visiting this possibility unless right wing talks fall apart, too. This would also have a majority of one. Parties: The Independence Party, the Progressive Party, the Reform Party and the People’s Party. Chances? Middling, but passable, albeit with a majority of one. Parties: The Independence Party, the Progressive Party, the Centre Party and the Reform Party. Chances? Not great, because, again, the Progressives and the Centre Party are not on great terms. This would also have a majority of one. First
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