Reykjavík Grapevine - 18.06.2010, Page 6

6
The Reykjavík Grapevine
Issue 08 — 2010
Deal With It :
Vooral Gerard van Vliet on why Iceland needs
to pay the Icesave depositors
Words
Paul F. Nikolov
Photography
Julia Staples
Interview | Debts And When To Pay Them
Heads up clergymen: it seems that Icelanders aren’t
too keen on being Christian these days. Registration
in the National Church of Iceland is dropping, ac-
cording to recent polls.
The latest numbers from DataMarket show that
the number of people registering as having no re-
ligion is increasing in a similar proportion to the
decrease in registration in the National Church.
Of course, this graph is a bit misleading, because
roughly 80% of Icelanders are already registered
members of the church, but it does show a trend.
The drop in registration could be attributed to nu-
merous factors, such as deaths and registration into
other religions. It could also show that Icelanders are
growing less fond of having a state run church or
being dishonestly subscribed to a religious organisa-
tion that they do not actively believe or participate
in. Maybe in post-collapse Iceland, where people
are losing faith in everything around them, nihilism
just seems like the better way to go. Or they just hate
God.
The National Church: Not So Popular
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
National Church
No Religion
2009200820072006200520042003200220012000199819981997199619951994
Margin of increase or decrease
Source: Statistics Iceland and DataMarket
Changes In Religion 1994 - 2009
Iceland | Statistics
Year No Religion National Church
1994 +151 -397
1995 +159 -653
1996 +1379 -2237
1997 +318 -912
1998 +143 -617
1999 +198 -882
2000 +298 -931
2001 +176 -765
2002 +136 -686
2003 +168 -843
2004 +155 -953
2005 +215 -851
2006 +567 -1212
2007 +685 -1484
2008 +480 -1230
2009 +1059 -1744
The cool statistics come from our cool friends at
They've got an almost endless amount of sexy data, free for all,
at www.datamarket.com. Also check out www.grapevine.is/
statistics for an interactive graph, y'all!
Tell us about your group. What inspired you to start this
entire project?
No one knows exactly how many there are, but our mem-
bers are all people who lost more than 100.000 Euros
from their Icesave accounts. Personally, I had a good
relationship with Iceland. I'd been here, had a good re-
lationship with the people here, and wanted to put my
money here.
So it had nothing to do with the interest rates Icesave was
offering?
No, not at all, because you could get the same interest
rates in a Dutch account at the time. Everybody's talk-
ing about the extra percentage, but it wasn't there. If you
looked at the market you'd find competitors offering the
same amount. Maybe you had to take it in a one month
account or a three month account, instead of a f loating
account, but in general you could get comparable rates
elsewhere.
And these other banks are still solvent?
All of them. Only one of them went down, and that was
Icesave, because these other banks either stayed solvent,
or the government rescued them. But in any event, with
Icesave—my house was sold. I'd had the intention of
moving back to Kenya because I had children’s’ projects
there. We were on the edge of starting a coconut factory
project, where 15.000 farmers would have taken part. I
had other banks joining me on this project, but it was my
starting capital. I put my money [in Icesave] on the 27th
of August 2008. And of course we lost that money, so my
main motivation in getting involved in this was one; it's
for charity and two; it's for children and for the farmers.
Within seven days of starting this project, without know-
ing who was involved, we had sixty people and it’s grown
to about 250.
I understand you met with some government officials
yesterday. How did that go?
You could say “astonishing.” You have to realise, time
and time again, that Iceland is only 320.000 people. It's
acting like a country, but it has the resources of a small
city. Besides that, you also have to realise that the point of
view within Iceland is totally different than the point of
the view of the rest of the world. If you look at the report
of the [Special Investigative Commission], you can see in
all transparency what happened. And I think that makes
some people responsible for what happened. To put it
bluntly, we were fucked up.
So I'm sitting at a table with one person from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one from the Ministry of Fi-
nance and one from the Prime Minister's office. They're
sitting opposite you, telling you that they're not aware of
what's going on, and not aware of the fact that they're
responsible, and not aware that something has to be
done—well, I think that's a lousy game.
They told you specifically that they're not aware that any-
one's responsible?
Well, they don't think they're responsible. It's only be-
cause EFTA told them that they are responsible for the
20.000 euro guarantee sum [per deposit]. Before that
time, they didn't believe they were responsible for the
deposit scheme itself. They said, “For one bank, maybe,
but for all the banks, er, we're not responsible.” But now
it's clear they're responsible for the first 20.000, but they
deny they're responsible for the rest of the savings. It's
hard to believe that people are thinking that way.
What are your thoughts on Bert Heemskerk's remarks
that Holland can pretty much forget about seeing the en-
tirety of the Icesave money?
Well, the thing you have to understand about Bert is that
he used to run a large bank called Rabobank, and at a
time when Icesave was being applauded as challenging
the larger banks, he was saying that Landsbanki was go-
ing to collapse. At the time, the media said he was just
jealous. But to be honest, I don't think he really knows
what's going on.
Yesterday, I asked the government representatives,
“Why didn't you ever think of a solution?” Because if
we're all friends, you know, Dutch, British, Iceland—
we're all friends—if they're really your friends, why
didn't you ask them for a solution? Help on an economic
level, help on an energy level, what have you. And I was
told, “Well, then you show them your weakness.” And I'm
astonished about that.
What sort of solutions are we talking about here?
I talked to the Dutch distributor of energy. And they're
mainly responsible for the distribution of energy
throughout Europe. And I asked them if it would be fea-
sible to have an electricity line between Iceland and Nor-
way or Iceland and the UK, because we already have lines
between the UK and Norway through the Netherlands.
Nowadays, it's possible to have those lines without a sig-
nificant loss of electricity. It's easily possible, and we're
even prepared to pay for that.
So what's stopping it?
I don't know. Pride? Stupidity? Non-commitment? I have
no idea. Because if Iceland put their energy into Eu-
rope, they could get four or five times as much money
as they're getting from the smelters here. Why nobody is
thinking about this? I have no idea.
Many Icelanders—and I think this was the main reason
why the previous Icesave bill was defeated—ask them-
selves, “I'm not a bank manager. Why should I be paying
for part of this debt?”
That's the bad part of democracy. If your administrators,
your government guys, your statesmen are fucking up,
then the whole of the nation carries the burden. That's
everywhere. You know the situation where a minister is
sacked because of something his predecessor did wrong.
Granted, but we're talking about payments that could
span over decades, paid for by Icelanders not even born
yet.
Yes, but somebody allowed it to get that far. The banks
didn't grow by themselves; they were allowed to do it. The
government closed its eyes, the Central Bank closed its
eyes, the bank managers closed their eyes, the sharehold-
ers closed their eyes. So, of course you can't blame the
guy on the street for things getting this far, but you can
blame everyone else. And one of the bad things about
democracy is you're responsible, all in all, for the things
being done in parliament. It's lousy, but that's what hap-
pens.
Well, the counter to that is, “Sure, we're responsible for
the government we elect, but they lied to us. We didn't
know what was going on.”
Even in those circumstances, you're liable.
Do you think that information was intentionally withheld
from the public?
I think so, and if you look at the press, who really knew
what was going on? At the time, information was ma-
nipulated. Right up until the collapse, you could look at
the bank reports, saying everything was great. If you look
at the reports of Fitch, of Moody's, or Standard & Poor's,
they knew what was going on, but that information was
kept in professional circles. The individual in the street
didn't know anything about it. Because the press didn't
report it. The press in the Netherlands lauded Icesave as a
hero, because they were challenging the big banks.
Ideally, what would you like to see happen, and what do
you think will actually end up happening?
Ideally, I'd hope someone, somewhere, somehow would
say, “Well, guys, you're 250 people. The money we owe
you is 25 million [Euros].” On the whole we're talking
about billions and billions, so on a larger level, 25 million
is lousy money. On a personal level, it's serious money.
It's pension money, housing money, children's study
money. If you're really serious about this, you should pay
them.
Without interest?
Well, at the very least the money that people put in should
be there. But what I would say is, “Because you've been
so stubborn, you're going to pay double the interest, you
lousy statesmen.” If you don't understand that there are
real people behind this money—not an institution, or
a bank—then you have to be punished. It's real money
from real people.
The EFTA said that number one, consumers should be
able to rely on their banks to hold onto their money. And
number two, that Iceland discriminated. Icelanders got
their money back, people outside of Iceland didn't. And
in our case, which is coming up next month, we're hop-
ing that they say the same.
What would you like to tell the average Icelander on the
street—what do you think is imperative they understand,
that they're maybe not getting?
First all, I'm sorry to say, but some countrymen fucked
you up, and you have to bear the responsibility for that.
That's democracy. You have to understand that. It's not a
question of personal responsibility but collective respon-
sibility. And take that responsibility to the government.
So if the prosecutor says, “We won't go after [former Cen-
tral Bank chairman Davíð] Oddsson, and we won't go af-
ter [former Prime Minister Geir H.] Haarde,” then that's
your responsibility, and the Icelanders should start a new
pots-and-pans revolution to get those responsible pun-
ished. Secondly, better clean up ship sooner than later.
The earlier you do it—and they should have done it long
ago—the better off you'll be. If you put your energy into
positive things, positive things will grow.
Vooral Gerard van Vliet was running a children's
project in Kenya, and in August 2008 decided to
invest his money in Icesave. Like many others out-
side of Iceland who had an account there, he lost
that money. He began to bring other Dutch Icesave
depositors together, founding among other things
the website Icesaving.nl—his organisation is now
about 250 members strong. Grapevine got a chance
to talk with Vooral shortly after he met with Icelan-
dic government officials to try and get his take on
the issue.
FACTS. INSIGHT. BEAUTY.
REBECCA LOUdER