Fjölrit RALA - 05.12.1999, Síða 25

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RODNEY GALLACHER
Box 2. Typology of Participation.
Levela) Typology
Components (reduced)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Passive participation:
Participation in information:
Participation by consultation:
Participation for incentives:
Functional participation:
Interactive participation:
Self mobilization:
People are told what will happen or is taking place
People answer survey team’s questions (no follow-up)
People answer questions but outsiders defme/design
People work for cash, food or other incentives
Decisions by outsiders, groups form to meet objectives
Joint analysis and decisions for action plans, group
implements, monitors
Initiatives taken independently ffom official institutions
a) These levels of participation are not intended to imply that 1 is bad and 7 is the ideal (Modi-
fied after J. Pretty 1994).
Problem identification
There is still work to be done on sociology and economics aspects to address the more
difficult issue of drafting policy to plan, policy to manage. But the difference is that
we are now able to call on a worldwide team of highly specialized volunteers. We
ought to make use of this opportunity, as it may not last in present form. And we
should develop rigorous guidelines to avoid collecting superfluous information.
The Intemational Scheme for Conservation and Rehabilitation of Affican Lands,
ISCRAL (FAO 1990) recommends paths for addressing land user needs while
strengthening institutes. Afficans helped at various stages in the design of ISCRAL.
Range management is an essential ingredient of the land use options.
The innovative Zimbabwe experience (Box 3) gives a lot of food for thought. The
University of Zimbabwe discussed various scenarios with stakeholders in order to pre-
sent drafts to govemment. The proposition outlined in the box refers to rangelands,
which was perhaps the most straightforward case; private access cropping land pre-
sented many more difficulties.
Box 3. Economic Management of Natural Resources, Zimbabwe.
Villages are being transformed into democratic companies in Zimbabwe. This alters the system
from birthright access to land, to membership in owning and managing village assets as essen-
tially a property company. Members agree on yearly allocation of rights to arable or grazing land,
water or woodlands. For grazing, the community decides how many animals to carry (for exam-
ple, 1,000) and this total is divided by the number of members (example, 100) to give equitable
shares. Members may trade shares among themselves when arriving at a price for grazing (such
as $10 per unit). In this example the value of the grazing is $10,000 for the company and $100 for
each member. If the company at the annual general meeting decides to retain part ofthe value for
reinvestment, members contribute in proportion to their share holding. Some may need to sell
part of their grazing rights to raise the due money.
This total land use value is a solid basis for negotiating company bank ioans since repayment
is assured (N. Reynolds 1992).