The Icelandic Canadian - 01.06.2000, Blaðsíða 28
Vol. 55 #4
THE ICELANDIC CANADIAN
326
Republic. In the words of Secretary Albright,
when she welcomed the new members at the
Truman Library in Missouri, “It is a home-
coming - an irreversible affirmation of their
belonging within the democratic community
of the west.’’ Hopefully we can all be reas-
sured by Secretary Albright’s words that
“they will not be the last.”
The role of small nations
Mr. Chairman.
I hope I have by my remarks so far given
you some perception of how we, Icelanders,
look upon Iceland’s role in the strategy of
North Atlantic security. In conclusion, allow
me to say a few words about the role of small
nations within our alliance. Sometimes, hav-
ing been the Foreign Minister of a small
nation with no military forces of our own, I
was asked, if Iceland was not really a “free
rider” in this military alliance? Or what con-
tributions we could make to the alliance as a
whole.
I have already explained what contribu-
tion Iceland had to make during the second
World War, and by implication during the
cold war, enabling the alliance to maintain,
from a secure base, the security of the sea
lanes of communication across the Atlantic -
a matter of vital importance for sustaining
American - European co-operation in times of
crisis. And by the way: We Icelanders lost
more lives at sea, relative to our population,
than the actual belligerents during the second
World War, while trying to feed the British
during their time of need but also their “finest
hour.” They were seamen, who became vic-
tims of relentless German U-Boat warfare,
during the battle of the Atlantic.
In the post Cold-War era Iceland has per-
sistently and actively participated in allied
operations in peace-keeping and in humani-
tarian missions and relief work in war-torn
areas, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and later
Kosovo, by supplying trained personnel in
areas such as hospital services and law
enforcement. Iceland has also participated in
exercises for rescue-operations and relief-
work, caused by natural disasters, and given
development aid for reconstruction and basic
services in areas ravaged by war, from the
Balkans to Palestine.
But the example of Iceland also shows
that small nations can have a meaningful role
to play within the alliance, in formulating pol-
icy, especially when the major powers are
hindered by real politic or special interests to
do what is right (but not necessary expedient).
Western support for the restoration of inde-
pendence of the Baltic nations is a case in
point. In 1989-91, when democratically elect-
ed governments had come to power in all
three Baltic nations, claiming recognition of
their restored independence, after half a cen-
tury of enforced annexation by the Soviet
Empire, the major Western powers tended to
lend a deaf ear to their justified claims.
President Bush worried that overt support
might undermine Gorbachev’s position,
endanger glasnost and perestroika or exclude
(tacit) Soviet co-operation during the Gulf
War. Herr Kohl and Foreign Minister
Genscher felt that German reunification
depended on Soviet goodwill and were not
ready to do anything that might offend the
rulers in the Kremlin.
Democratically elected representatives of
the Baltic nations during this critical period,
were generally given a cold shoulder or had to
knock on closed doors in international organi-
zations, lest the Soviets be offended. Under
those circumstances Iceland - and later
Denmark and other small nations within
NATO - took up the Baltic cause and spoke
up for them within NATO, the OSCE, the
UN, the European Council etc., while others
remained uncomfortably silent. Our message
was that under no circumstances could the
Western powers negotiate a settlement with
the Soviets on the consequences of the second
World War in Central and Eastern Europe,
but turn a deaf ear to the legitimate claims of
the Baltic nations who, arguably, had suffered
the most from under Nazi and Soviet repres-
sion.
In August 1991, a few days after the
aborted attempt at coup d’Etat, in Moscow,
Iceland became the first state to give full
diplomatic recognition to the restored sover-
eignty of the Baltic nations, thus initiating a
process that soon became irreversible. And
when later Slovenia and Croatia had repelled
military action, meant to keep them in the
Yugoslav federation by force, Iceland again