Lögberg-Heimskringla - 25.01.1980, Blaðsíða 2

Lögberg-IIeimskringla, f östudagur 25. janáar, 1980
2
PAUL BUTEUX:
The Continuing
Strategic Significance
For most people (other
than Icelanders), Iceland is
the forgotten member of
NATO. With the smallest
population of any of the
fifteen nations that make up
the organization, and the
only one without armed
forces, it is not surprising
that the contribution made
by Iceland to the alliance is
sometimes overlooked by
her allies. Of course, from
time-to-time, Iceland makes
the headlines in the Western
Press in a way that draws
attention to the fact that
Iceland is in NATO, though
'not always in a manner that
indicates that it is desirable
that she be so. Usually, the
occasions for the outside
interest in Icelandic foreign
policy have been provided
either by the once
ubiquitous codfish, or by the
imminent participation of
communists in the Icelandic
government.
Cod wars serve to in-
dicate that resources are an
important part of the great
game of international
politics, and the lively
dances of Icelandic
politicians remind the
outside observer that
Iceland’s membership in
NATO can still be a matter
of domestic controversy.
However," it is neither
resources nor the
ideological composition of
the government that ac-
counts for the importance of
Iceland to the alliance;
rather, this is to be found in
Iceland’s continuing
strategic significance.
Iceland is valued as an
ally precisely because she
does have strategic
significance; her
geographical position in the
North Atlantic ensures that
she will be the object of
attention of all those powers
whose security is bound up
with the military balance in
this region. Put simply, the
geographic location of
Iceland in relation to the
main North Atlantic sea and
air routes between North
America and Western
Europe means that the
possession of access to her
territory and air space is an
extremely valuable military
asset. This fact was forcibly
underscored for Icelanders
in 1940 when British forces
landed in Reykjavik in order
to forestall a possible
German occupation and to
protect Britain’s vital lines
of communication with the
United States and Canada.
Accepting the impossibility
of neutrality in the event of a
conflict between major
powers in the North
Atlantic, the following year
the Icelandic government
entered into an agreement
with the United States that
American forces should take
over responsibility for the
defence of Iceland. Under
various agreements,
American military per-
sonnel have been there ever
since.
Presently, the presence of
American forces in Iceland
is governed by the 1951
Defence Agreement as
subsequently amended. This
agreement was made within
the context of NATO, of
which Jceland was a
founder member, and
contradicted a declaration
made at the time of Iceland’s
acceptance of the North
Atlantic Treaty that Iceland
would not be required to
accept foreign troops or
provide military bases in
peacetime. In fact, of
course, the Americans
never left, but the 1951
agreement provided for a
much more extensive United
States military presence.
The outbreak of the Korean
War in 1950 had brought
about a reappraisal of the
state of North Atlantic
security, and had led in turn
to the transformation of
NATO from essentially a
guarantee pact into an
integrated military
organization. Iceland was
not immune to this process,
and as a result of the 1951
agreement a United States
Defence force was
established with the two-
fold task of defending
Iceland and of ensuring the
security of the surrounding
seas. At this time Iceland
was seen as playing a role in
the security of the North
Atlantic area not unlike that
of the Second World War.
The allied presence in
Iceland during the Second
World War had assisted in
the performance of thiee
vital military functions.
These were the surveillance
of the North Atlantic, the
exercise of air and sea-
control ovér it, and the
provision of bases and
staging areas for rein-
forcements of men and
material crossing the
Atlantic from North
America to Europe. Today,
Iceland finds herself in a
dramatically changed
technological and strategic
environment. Were East-
West conflict to occur, few
expect that there would be
an extended war of attrition
like that of the Second
World War in which Iceland
would be a vital link in
North Atlantic com-
munications. Nonetheless,
these three military func-
tions remain significant, and
Iceland has a continuing
part to play in their effective
performance.
The essential basis of the
strategic posture of NATO is
that of maintaining the
conditions for effective and
credible deterrence. Thus a
crucial objective of alliance
strategy is the maintenance
of a military balance and
demonstrable military
capability that is sufficient
to deter an adversary from
the use of force, or from the
temptation to overtly
threaten the use of force in
support of political ob-
jectives. It has been
recognized for many years
that the simple threat of
nuclear retaliation is not
sufficient to meet these
needs. Once the United
States herself became
vulnerable to Soviet nuclear
retaliation it was clear that
the character of the
American nuclear
guarantee to NATO would
have to change. The threat
of “massive retaliation” in
the event of a Soviet attack
on Western Europe gave
way to the doctrine of
“flexible response” in which
the NATO allies threatened
to respond in a manner
appropriate to the
character of the military
threat offered. __
Even here, however, the
requirements of flexible
response have changed in
the light of changing
strategic and technological
circumstances. Particularly
significant in this respect
has been the recognition of
parity between the United
States and Soviet Union in
the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT),
and the increasing ef-
fectiveness of the con-
ventional and theatre
nuclear forces of the
Warsaw Pact. (Theatre
nuclear forces, which are
possessed by both sides, are
those which could be used in
the event of war in Europe,
but which by virtue of their
limited range could not be
launched from the
homelands of the two super-
powers against the territory
of the other.) These
developments háve
generated doubts about the
ability of NATO to meet its
members’ needs.
For most of the allies, the
political effectiveness of
membership in NATO is
measured not only by the
ability o'f the alliance to
deter nuclear war as such;
also of importance is the
ability of the alliance to
deny the adversary the
political and diplomatic
benefits that can flow from
the capacity to deploy
military forces in ways in
which the threat to retaliate
with nuclear weapons
would be neither credible
nor appropriate. This
requires that the allies be
able to respond to any
military threat in a fashion
commensurate with the
scale and character of the
threat offered. And this in
turn requires that the
alliance possess a range of
conventional and nuclear
options below the level of a
strategic nuclear response.
Among these options, the
ability to secure command of
the seas and airspace of the
North Atlantic, and to
ensure communications
between North America and
Europe remains
strategically relevant. Thus
Iceland, despite the changes
in the strategic environment
in which NATO operates,
continues to have an im-
portant strategic role in the
alliance.
In the strategic scheme of
things, Iceland has both
actual and potential roles.
The actual role of Iceland is
indicated by the present
character and composition
of the American Defence
Force; the potential role is
indicated by the likely
character of any East-West
conflict. The Americans
maintain two important
radar stations, other
communications facilities
and naval installations.
However, the most visible
function of the Defence
Force is to service and
operate the long-range
maritime patrol aircraft and
the air defence squadron
based at Keflavik.
These forces and in-
stallations are primarily
geared towards maritime
surveillance and anti-
submarine warfare and
allow for the monitoring of
naval activity in the North
Atlantic both on the surface
and underwater. Russian
submarines and surface
units leaving their ice free
bases around Murmansk
must, in order to come on
station in the Atlantic, pass
through the so-called GIUK
gap. This gap refers to the
waters bounded by
Greenland, Iceland, the
Faroes and Scotland, and by
means of aircraft, radars,
sonar and communication
facilities deployed on, or
adjacent to, these territories
a close and effective watch
can be maintained on Soviet
naval activities.
The denial of any of these
territories as bases for this
surveillance activity,
Keflavik for example, would
seriously compromise the
A U.S Patrole Aircraft