Lögberg-Heimskringla - 25.01.1980, Blaðsíða 3

Lögberg-Heimskringla, föstudagur 25. janúar, 1980
of lceland
ability of allied forces to
maintain a constant scrutiny
of Soviet naval movements
and, if necessary, to engage
in anti-submarine and
surface warfare. Indeed,
the Keflavik base and its
associated facilities are of
crucial importance because
it is difficult to see how the
surveillance of the North
Atlantic could be performed
adequately without them.
Effective coverage of
Soviet naval activity in the
North Atlantic serves a
number of strategic and
tactical purposes. First it
provides intelligence in-
formation on which to base
military planning. In the
event of war or major crisis,
the availability of reliable
and up-to-date information
on the size, character and
deployment of the ad-
versary’s forces could
vitally affect the outcome of
the conflict or the possibility
of managing the crisis.
Secondly, the ability to
detect shifts in the pattern
of Soviet naval deployments
can serve to give political
and tactical warning of
shifts in Soviet policy.
Again, in a crisis, such
warning may be crucial.
Finally, confidence in the
quality of military in-
telligence is a major factor
determining the credibility
and stability of one’s
nuclear deterrent.
A significant proportion of
the strategic nuclear
forces of both the United
States and the Soviet Union
is deployed on nuclear
submarines. Given the
range of the majority of
missiles currently deployed
in Soviet submarines, in
order to reach targets in the
United States, the greater
part of the Russian ballistic
missile submarine fleet
would have to be deployed
in the Western Atlantic. The
Russians maintain a fairly
constant number on station
at all times, and clearly it is
in the American interest to
maintain a constant check
on these deployments.
Similarly, for American
submarines to come on
station unimpeded access to
the Atlantic is rcquired. The
confidence of each side in
the credibility and ef-
festiveness of its deterrent
forces is regarded by most
strategists as an essential
component in deterrent
stability. So long as each
side is confident in its ability
to retaliate effectively in the
event of an attack by the
other, then it can be argued
that a situation of mutual
deterrence exists in which
each side will be con-
strained in the risks it will
take with respect to con-
flicts of interest with the
adversary. In other words,
insofar as international
security in the North
Atlantic region is a function
of mutual deterrence, then
the effective surveillance of
the region by NATO forces
is an essential component of
stability.
With the development by
both the United States and
the Soviet Union of longer
range submarine launched
missiles (with ranges in the
order of 4000 nautical
miles), the significance of
the North Atlantic as an
area of deployment for
strategic nuclear missile
submarines is bound to
decline. Nonetheless, the
shorter range missiles will
continue to be deployed for
some time to come yet, and
so the North Atlantic and
GIUK gap will continue to be
important for the strategic
deterrents of all the nuclear
powers with forces in the
region. And, anyway, the
use of the North Atlantic by
strategic missile sub-
marines, as already pointed
out, is only one component
of the area’s strategic
importance.
The ability to effectively
“police” the North Atlantic
in peacetime, and the
prospect of being able to
maintain lines of com-
munication in wartime is
one of the few areas of clear
NATO superiority over the
forces of the Warsaw Pact.
In a situation of concern in
Western capitals about the
growing strength of the
forces of the Soviet Union
and its allies in the Warsaw
Pact, the possession of some
area of military superiority
is not without symbolic
political importance. For
this state of affairs to be
maintained, military access
to the litoral states of the
North Atlantic is required.
Thus, were the NATO
facilities in Iceland to be
lost, not only would the
surveillance capabilities of
the alliance in the region be
weakened, but this would
also be widely perceived as
damaging to the political
cohesion of the alliance, and
would undoubtedly have
wider political reper-
cussions.
With respect to the
potential role of Iceland in
the event of conflict in
Europe, the development by
the United States of a direct
airlift capacity to reinforce
its forces in Western Europe
has somewhat reduced the
significance of Iceland as a
transit base for tran-
satlantic reinforcements.
Still, it is possible to con-
ceive of circumstances in
which the availability of
staging and assembly
facilities in and around
Iceland would continue to be
militarily significant. More
importantly, the existence of
military bases in Iceland
can be interpreted as a
measure of Iceland’s
commitment to the alliance
and can act as insurance
against outside coercion.
Against the latter concern,
the presence of American
forces would act to con-
strain the Soviet Union from
risking some kind of
dangerous fait accompli in a
crisis. For, after all, it is
usually more difficult to
return to a position
previously vacated than it is
to reinforce one already
occupied. This is even more
the case in a situation of
nuclear confrontation.
As long as Iceland con-
tinues to have strategic
significance for the major
powers, then there will be
pressure on her to respond
to their security concerns.
Iceland, in 1949, in effect
decided that the best
protection of her freedom of
action lay in her mem-
bership in NATO. Par-
ticipation in the alliance
ensured at minimum a right
to be consulted in decisions
affecting her fate and the
opportunity to place her
relations with the United
States in a multilateral
context; no small con-
sideration when _ a small
power confronts a much
larger one, and which
Iceland successfully ex-
ploited against the United
Kingdom during the cod
wars. Conversely, the
willingness of outside
powers to respond sym-
pathetically to Iceland’s
concerns will be in part a
function of Iceland’s value
to them. At the present time,
the main strategic value of
Iceland to those countries
politically and economically
most important to her, and
who happen to be her allies
in NATO, lies in the sur-
veillance facilities made
available to the American
Defence Force. Without
these facilities, Iceland
would remain strategically
significant, but her value as
an ally would be very much
reduced. In these cir-
cumstances, Iceland might
welPfind herself far more
directly exposed to great
power competition in the
North Atlantic.paulButeuXj
Department of
Political Studies,
University of Manitoba
j3
To Kalla:
DOUG'S SAGA
A friend to greet you on arrival
At once assures you of survival
Warm greetings and a helping hand
Good food, good friends, “Welcome to Iceland”.
A bus ride through a fairy land
Camera ever in our hand
Don’t step there, a “troll” may dwell
A tourist guide has a saga to tell.
Prancing ponies, lava fields
Glaciers cool and Nordic shields
Wild flowers blooming on the rock
Fish boats side by side at dock.
Bubbling mud and jets of steam
Make it seem a land of dreams **
Valcanoes everywhere are smoking
They say that it’s the devil stoking.
Heated pools and planes so sleek
Salmon leaping in the creek
Fish upon the racks are drying
While woolen sweaters we are buying.
Puffins posing by the sea
While sheep graze contentedly
Memories like these and more
We take with us from Iceland’s shore.
Sad of eye, but warm in heart
It’s time for us to depart
A fond farewell to new found friends
And “like all good things” our journey ends.
Höfundur þessa ljóðs er Doug Hall, sem ferð Aist með
konu sinni Hazel Sigurdson til Islands sl. sumar. Heim-
sóttu þau þar ættingja Hazel en hún er af íslenskum
ættum. Móðir hennar er Helga Bjarnason úr Þingvalla-
byggðinni í Saskatchewan en faðir hennar var Her-
mann Sigurdson frá Eriksdale í Manitoba. Sjálfur er
höfundurinn Doug frá Englandi.
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In memory of Mrs. K. Grimson
Mr. and Mrs. George Cole
In memory of Mrs. Salome Johnson
Sólskin
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from Mrs. Sena Anderson
and Miss Lillian Eyolfson
In memory of Mr. Gisli Benedictson
Mrs. Elmina North; Mrs. Lenore Jones;
Mrs Louise Ferguson and Ms. Emily Axdal
In memory of Mr. H.S. (Steini) DaJman
Sigfus Johannson and Family Members
Ethel Reinholt
Gudjon Johnson; Lena Lindal;
Evelyn Merinuk and David Lindal
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S. GOODMAN, Treasurer for Höfn
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