Reykjavík Grapevine - 15.07.2011, Blaðsíða 24

Reykjavík Grapevine - 15.07.2011, Blaðsíða 24
24 The Reykjavík Grapevine Issue 10 — 2011 From the top f loor of Reykjavík En-ergy headquarters, an expansive view of Mount Hengill can be observed on the eastern horizon. The mountain range forms part of the Mid-Atlantic Ridge as it cuts through Iceland and divides the country between the North American and Eurasian continental plates. It is one of the most geologically active areas in the world. Two thick white clouds of steam can be seen rising up from the mountain where Reykjavík Energy operates the Nesjavellir and Hellishei!i geothermal power plants. Together the plants pro- vide hot water and electricity to more than half of Iceland’s population of 318.452. Over the last half century, Iceland has successfully established a name for itself as a world-renowned leader in the field of geothermal energy, using it to heat 90% of the country’s buildings and nearly all 136 swimming pools in the country. As Iceland’s President Óla- fur Ragnar Grímsson said at a geother- mal conference last year, “We were very fortunate that while most of the world forgot about the geothermal sector, we had visionaries in Iceland. Not just sci- entists and technical experts, but also local councillors in towns and cities who saw the opportunities in this area.” The President is well known today for having travelled the world during Iceland’s boom years giving lauda- tory speeches about the nation’s val- iant bankers who led the country to economic prosperity, to the extent that some have called it cheerleading. How- ever, since the crash he has abandoned the bankers, and now travels the world singing songs of praise for Iceland’s geothermal “visionaries,” who, instead of the bankers, helped “transform a country of farmers and fishermen into one of the most prosperous welfare economies in the world.” The story goes, as he told it in Xia- men, China last year, “In my youth, over 80% of Iceland’s energy needs came from fossil fuel, imported coal and oil. We were a poor nation, primar- ily of farmers and fishermen, classified by the UNDP as a developing country right down to the 1970s. Now, despite the effects of the present financial cri- sis, we are among the most prosperous nations in the world, largely due to the transformation which made our elec- tricity production and space heating based 100% on clean energy.” He emphasises the last point that Iceland’s geothermal energy business has served to offset the effects of the economic crisis: “Yes, indeed,” he said in Abu Dhabi, Bali, and Shanghai last year, and again in New York this year, “geothermal energy has helped Iceland to survive the recent banking shock […].” While the story that the President tells about Iceland’s transformation to geothermal energy is indeed mar- vellous, and it is true that the cost of heating and electricity is nowhere in Europe cheaper, one would have to be wearing rose-tinted glasses to see Reyk- javík’s geothermal energy business as a saviour in the crisis. Upon closer inspection it appears that the country’s largest multi-utility geothermal energy company, which claims to operate “the largest and most sophisticated district heating system in the world,” has only driven the nation into deeper water. A FINANCIAL BASKETCASE IS UNVEILED When The Best Party came to power in Reykjavík after the May 2010 elections, the comedian-turned-Mayor Jón Gnarr said he was surprised to learn that Reykjavík Energy was in such a hor- rible financial state. “I had always had the impression that it was the wealth in the city,” he said of the company that is 94% owned by the city Reykjavík and exploits what is arguably Iceland’s greatest resource. Yet despite the abundance of re- sources and a steady demand for its services, Reykjavík Energy managed to rack up a 233 billion ISK debt (2 bil- lion USD or 1.4 billion Euros), which is nearly four times the city’s annual bud- get of 60 billion ISK. What’s more, 200 billion ISK (1.7 billion USD or 1.2 bil- lion Euros) of this debt is in the form of foreign currency loans, which f luctuate at the whim of the króna. “For months I found myself in daily meetings directly or indirectly related to Reykjavík Energy,” Jón Gnarr told me, admitting that it grew very tiresome. It was around that time, on Septem- ber 25, 2010 at 11:43 pm, that he wrote the Facebook status update that would come back to haunt him in the form of political ammunition six months later [our translation]: “Reykjavík Energy is bankrupt. The city is in bad shape and its revenue has decreased. What should be done? Cut backs? Price increases? Streamlining? Where and how much? Meetings, meetings, meetings…” Aiming to clean up the mess, Jón Gnarr’s team brought in Haraldur Flosi Tryggvason as Chairman of the Board and made him a full-time execu- tive director with the gargantuan task of getting the company back on track. The initial ‘rescue operations’ included orchestrating a mass layoff of 65 em- ployees in October 2010 and raising the price of heating and electricity by 27% between November 2010 and January of this year, to little fanfare from citi- zens and employees alike. Though the decision to hire Haral- dur Flosi was initially criticised be- cause he had been the head attorney at L"sing, a company that guaranteed the now-deemed illegal foreign currency loans to individuals, he is also one of the few Chairmen in the history of Reykjavík Energy to have a background in business. “We have made an effort to hire people based on professional train- ing and experience rather than political affiliation,” Jón Gnarr told me. In February, Haraldur Flosi had been noticeably cautious when he ex- plained to me how the company man- aged to accumulate such colossal debt. “If the crash had not happened, it wouldn’t have been nearly as bad,” he said. “When the financial crisis hit, Reykjavík Energy was in a huge expan- sion period, so it was quite exposed to the crash, and because loans were mostly financed in foreign currency, the company’s debt about doubled over- night.” The company chose foreign loans with a favourable interest rate of 1–2% over domestic loans with an interest rate of 10–15%. Had the company taken domestic loans at the higher interest rate, the debt would not have doubled in the crash, but it would nonetheless have been equally large today, Reykjavík En- ergy PR Manager Eiríkur Hjálmarsson would later tell me. While this suggests the company's massive debt cannot be wholly ex- plained by the crash, Haraldur Flosi was not interested in pointing any fin- gers. He admitted that the company was perhaps over-optimistic in its in- vestments, but yet his explanations were mostly framed by the economic crash. “The biggest problem today is get- ting financing,” he said. “Foreigners have become sceptical of the situation here in Iceland. It’s more difficult to get access to money and it’s more expen- sive,” he told me, adding diplomatically, “but I think it’s the same everywhere. Many companies abroad are also strug- gling to adjust to this new reality. This is in a nutshell what happened.” Less than one month later, this problem became more evident. Unable to secure loans from Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Citibank, Council of Europe Development Bank, European Invest- ment Bank and Nordic Investment Bank, Reykjavík Energy announced on March 29 that it would be dipping 12 billion ISK deep into the city’s reserve fund, which had been set aside for a situation like this. At the same time, the company an- nounced that it would cease paying the city its annual 800 plus million ISK in dividends, it would continue raising the price of hot water and electricity, it would lay off another 90 employees, and it would begin selling off all assets unrelated to its core business. These assets include everything from a fibre optics business to The Pearl, a Reykja- vík monument. Russian investors with ties to Ásgeir #ór Daví!sson from the sleazy Kópavogur strip club Goldfinger have already made an offer on Perlan, expressing an interest in turning the omnipresent monument into a f lashy casino. THE BEST PARTY TAKES THE RAP Despite the fact the Reykjavík Energy had been heavily in debt for years, little had been said about it. “The state of the company should have been pretty clear for some time now,” Jón Gnarr told me, “but for some reason, while Icesave fea- tured heavily in the public discourse, nobody talked about the state of Reyk- javík Energy though the company debt is four to five times the Icesave debt.” As soon as news of the emergency loan from the city broke, however, a blame game ensued. Fingers were pointed in all directions, but despite the fact that The Best Party is the only political party in Reykjavík that did not have a hand in running the company during the decade that it accumulated its monstrous debt, the fingers pointed were generally in the direction of Jón Gnarr and the new Reykjavík Energy directors. It started on March 27 with an ar- ticle on news website Vísir.is blaming Jón Gnarr and the new directors for making it difficult for the company to get its loans refinanced. As seems cus- tomary in the Icelandic media, Vísir based the entire story on an anonymous source: “According to our sources from the financial world, getting loans refi- nanced has not been going well, due to, among other reasons, comments that have been made by the directors and Jón Gnarr.” Specifically, the article said, ac- cording to their sources, investors had received a translation of one of Jón Gnarr’s Facebook statuses: “Reykjavík Energy is bankrupt.” The status, which has since been deleted (and is quoted above in its entirety), was posted in September 2010, six months prior to the Vísir story. This continued to be a point of con- tention for others, like Independence Party City Councillor and former May- or of Reykjavík Hanna Birna Kristjáns- dóttir, who publicly criticised Jón Gnarr for his comments about the company being bankrupt. She also disagreed with the idea of phrasing the city’s 12 billion ISK loan as a city bailout, which implied bankruptcy. This is despite Reykjavík Energy CEO Bjarni Bjarnar- son claiming that the company would not have been able to continue paying employee salaries without the loan. Then, on March 30, Haraldur Flosi’s predecessor as Chairman, Gu!laugur Gylfi Sverrisson, wrote a letter to the Overrun by Viking ambition, Reykjavík Energy built headquarters fit for Darth Vader, expanded ambitiously, dabbled in tiger prawn farming and flax seed production, went into the fibre optics busi- ness, invested in a new geothermal plant, speculated in places like Djibouti, and finally managed to run itself so completely into the ground that foreign investors will no longer offer the company loans. In hopes of rescuing its multi-utility service company from the depths of abyss, the city of Reykjavík stepped in this March with a 12 billion ISK (105 million USD) loan, which is nearly its entire reserve fund set aside for the company, but still only a fraction of the company’s massive foreign debt of 200 billion ISK (1.7 billion USD). With thousands of captive lifetime subscribers and a means of producing energy at very little cost, the company had all the mak- ings of a cash cow. So what happened to Reykjavík Energy, an en- tity that less than a decade ago was a perfectly viable, municipally owned company providing the city with basic utilities: cold water, hot water and electricity? REYKJAVÍK ENERGY IN DEEP WATER The untold story of geothermal energy in Iceland By Anna Andersen Photos by Alísa Kalyanova Featuring: Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, President of Iceland Anna Skúladóttir, former CFO Stefán Pálsson, historian and former museum curator Alfre! "orsteinsson, first Chairman of the Board Svandís Svavars- dóttir, Minister for the Environment and former Board member Kjartan Magnússon, former Chairman of the Board Jón Gnarr, Mayor of Reykjavík Haraldur Flosi Tryg- gvasson, current Chairman of the Board Gu!mundur "óroddsson, first CEO of Reykjavík Energy Haukur Leósson, former Chairman of the Board “Reykjavík Energy is bankrupt. The city is in bad shape and its revenue has decreased. What should be done? Cut backs? Price increases? Streamlining? Where and how much? Meetings, meetings, meetings…”
Blaðsíða 1
Blaðsíða 2
Blaðsíða 3
Blaðsíða 4
Blaðsíða 5
Blaðsíða 6
Blaðsíða 7
Blaðsíða 8
Blaðsíða 9
Blaðsíða 10
Blaðsíða 11
Blaðsíða 12
Blaðsíða 13
Blaðsíða 14
Blaðsíða 15
Blaðsíða 16
Blaðsíða 17
Blaðsíða 18
Blaðsíða 19
Blaðsíða 20
Blaðsíða 21
Blaðsíða 22
Blaðsíða 23
Blaðsíða 24
Blaðsíða 25
Blaðsíða 26
Blaðsíða 27
Blaðsíða 28
Blaðsíða 29
Blaðsíða 30
Blaðsíða 31
Blaðsíða 32
Blaðsíða 33
Blaðsíða 34
Blaðsíða 35
Blaðsíða 36
Blaðsíða 37
Blaðsíða 38
Blaðsíða 39
Blaðsíða 40
Blaðsíða 41
Blaðsíða 42
Blaðsíða 43
Blaðsíða 44
Blaðsíða 45
Blaðsíða 46
Blaðsíða 47
Blaðsíða 48
Blaðsíða 49
Blaðsíða 50
Blaðsíða 51
Blaðsíða 52
Blaðsíða 53
Blaðsíða 54
Blaðsíða 55
Blaðsíða 56
Blaðsíða 57
Blaðsíða 58
Blaðsíða 59
Blaðsíða 60
Blaðsíða 61
Blaðsíða 62
Blaðsíða 63
Blaðsíða 64

x

Reykjavík Grapevine

Beinir tenglar

Ef þú vilt tengja á þennan titil, vinsamlegast notaðu þessa tengla:

Tengja á þennan titil: Reykjavík Grapevine
https://timarit.is/publication/943

Tengja á þetta tölublað:

Tengja á þessa síðu:

Tengja á þessa grein:

Vinsamlegast ekki tengja beint á myndir eða PDF skjöl á Tímarit.is þar sem slíkar slóðir geta breyst án fyrirvara. Notið slóðirnar hér fyrir ofan til að tengja á vefinn.