Reykjavík Grapevine - 15.07.2011, Blaðsíða 26

Reykjavík Grapevine - 15.07.2011, Blaðsíða 26
Taste the freshness of a farmer’s market Housed in one of the city’s oldest buildings, Fish Market uses ingredients sourced directly from the nation’s best farms, lakes, and sea to create unforgettable Icelandic dishes with a modern twist. A!ALSTRÆTI 12 | +354 578 8877 | FISHMARKET.IS 2008 GO LIST OPEN FOR LUNCH WEEKDAYS 11:30 - 14:00 OPEN EVERY EVENING 18:00 - 23:30 26 The Reykjavík Grapevine Issue 10 — 2011 of the bubble in Iceland,” Minister for the Environment Svandís Svavarsdóttir said. “The Left Greens always put a ques- tion mark next to heavy industry, but it was really the mainstream view. When we suggested that it was possible to do something else, people said, well ‘do you want to knit socks and pick moun- tain herbs?’ The Left Greens were considered a very foolish party for not wanting to proceed with heavy indus- try.” Following the city’s bailout, though, it has been increasingly debated whether a municipally owned com- pany should take the risks associated with making these kinds of heavy in- dustry deals given that the city and its taxpayers are accountable. Not only is Reykjavík Energy financially incapable of continuing with phase six of the Hellishei!i plant for the time being, but they have also for the first time turned their back on the company’s heavy in- dustry policy. “We think that Reykjavík Energy should fulfil its role as a service com- pany that provides people with electric- ity, hot and cold water, and sewage dis- posal,” Jón Gnarr explained. “We don’t think it should participate in heavy in- dustry or other risky investments.” BLOWING THE LID OFF 2007 Though it was undoubtedly unfor- tunate that Reykjavík Energy was in the middle of raising capital for the Hellishei!i plant when the crash hit, the company nonetheless made some very questionable decisions in 2007 at the peak of Iceland’s financial boom. For instance, the Board decided to buy shares in Hitaveita Su!urnesja for 13.4 billion ISK despite the fact that the company didn’t have any spare funds. The shares were paid for in entirety with a five year loan, which is due to come back to bite the company in 2013. Perhaps, though, the spirit of the times is best captured in Reykjavík Energy’s decision to boost its geother- mal operations overseas through a subsidiary company called Reykjavík Energy Invest (REI). At the same time as the banks had reached nearly ten times the nation’s GDP by expanding offshore, Reykjavík Energy also aspired to a world domination that made Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson proud. “I allege that if we continue like this,” he told a TV2 reporter in October 2007, “the Icelan- dic energy ‘outvasion’ can be an even bigger operation than the banks.” The event that the President was praising is now commonly referred to as the REI scandal, in which Reykjavík Energy brief ly merged its subsidiary company Reykjavík Energy Invest with Geysir Green Energy, a private com- pany owned by, amongst others, FL Group and Glitnir bank, which were highly implicated in Iceland’s banking collapse. According to an article that ap- peared in Fréttabla!i! on October 4, 2007, REI’s project list included the building and buying of about 700 MW of energy in the United States, Philip- pines, Greece, Indonesia, Germany and Ethiopia. Their goal was to produce three to four thousand megawatts be- fore year-end 2009, at which time they planned to go public. “These are very ambitious goals that will lead to the big- gest geothermal energy company in the world,” FL Group Chairman Hannes Smárason told Fréttabla!i!. Though Reykjavík Energy Chair- man of the Board at the time Haukur Leósson sincerely believed that the merger was in the best interest of the company, noting that they had negoti- ated 10 billion ISK for the use of Reyk- javík Energy’s brand name alone, it is widely believed that there was foul play involved. When the former CEO of Glitnir and Chairman of REI Bjarni Ármannsson admitted in 2009 that the merger between REI and GGE had been a mistake, Independence Party politician Gísli Marteinn Baldursson wrote on his blog, “Hopefully he now realises that there were other things than our deliberation that have done more damage to Iceland and one would wish that more had shown care.” Ultimately, the grand plans never materialised. After the company intro- duced the idea to the Board, news of the meeting went to the media and people were especially outraged to hear that key staff at Reykjavík Energy were be- ing given special stock options. “There was so much anger,” Svandís Svavars- dóttir recalled. “I did a lot of interviews in the span of two to three days. I’ve never felt anything like it. It was like ev- erything was burning in society. There was a lot of heat.” The controversy led the Indepen- dence Party and Progressive Party majority municipal government to fall apart, and a new majority between the Social Democrats, Progressives, Left Greens and Liberal Party formed with Dagur B. Eggertsson becoming Mayor of Reykjavík. While the so-called ‘100 day ma- jority’ reigned, a steering committee headed by Svandís with representatives from every political party was set up to look into the events and to determine whether any lessons could be learned. The more they learned, the more it became clear to them that the merger should be stopped. They felt that Reyk- javík Energy had developed too far from its owners and on its own initiative. “In many ways, the REI story is a prototype of the financial crisis. Politi- cians decided to allow private individu- als into public entities and let them be- have as if they owned what belonged to the public,” Svandís told me. “We saw that on a large and small scale in society. We saw it in the pri- vatisation of the phone company, the banks, in the privatisation plan of the right-leaning government, which ruled for far too long, for eighteen years, but in Reykjavík this was basically the same thing that happened.” At the same time as the REI deal was being discussed, an attempt was also made to privatise Reykjavík Ener- gy. Part of such a proposal, which was put forth by CEO Gu!mundur "órodds- son and Vice President Hjörleifur B. Kvaran on August 28, 2007 rational- ised that “[i]t is time to unleash the en- ergy of free enterprise so that Iceland’s expertise and knowledge can be used to the fullest extent in the geothermal energy company outvasion.” On September 3, 2007, the Board actually approved sending the proposal to the owners of the company for ap- proval, e.g. the Mayor of Reykjavík, “You got the impression that somewhere in Reykjavík Energy there was someone with a map, putting down f lags, you know with a Napoleonic dream of taking over.” THE REI SCANDAL The course of events January 25, 2007 Former Reykjavík Energy CEO Gu!mundur "óroddsson proposed to the Board that Reykjavík Energy create a subsidiary company called Reykjavík Energy Invest (REI), which would oversee all of Reyk- javík Energy’s stakes in ventures abroad, including Enex, Enex-Kína, Galantaterm and Iceland American Energy. The Board approved. March 7 The Board additionally agreed that Reykjavík Energy would put two billion ISK into REI towards future projects. A report that was commis- sioned at the January 25 Board meet- ing and then delivered at the March 7 Board meeting noted: “There is great interest amongst Icelandic in- vestors in environmentally friendly energy, for instance, Geysir Green Energy hf, Atorka hf and Enex hf. The first two named have already requested a partnership with Reyk- javík Energy in the outvasion.” June 11 Reykjavík Energy Invest was formal- ly founded. Appointed to the Board were Björn Ársæll Pétursson, Hau- kur Leósson, and Björn Ingi Hraf- nsson. Reykjavík Energy CEO Gu!- mundur "órodsson would replace Björn Ársæll Pétursson as CEO in September. September 11 Former CEO of Glitnir Bjarni Ár- mannsson was appointed Chair- man of REI and bought stock worth 500 million ISK. September 20 The Directors of REI met with bank- sters Hannes Smárason from GGE and Jón Ásgeir Jóhannesson from FL Group to discuss merging the companies. September 22 Chairman of REI Bjarni Ármans- son met with Chairman of GGE Hannes Smárason to f lesh out the details of the merger. September 23 Chairman of REI Bjarni Ármans- son and Chairman of Reykjavík Energy Haukur Leósson met with Mayor of Reykjavík Vilhjálmur ". Vilhjálmsson at his home to brief him on the merger. Vilhjálmur did not inform his colleagues in the In- dependence Party about the merger until October 2, which greatly upset them, and led to a rift in the Inde- pendence Party. October 3 Reykjavík Energy held a Board meet- ing and an owners meeting to intro- duce the merger. Invitations to the meeting were sent out the previous evening, which is extremely short notice. Nonetheless, the Board ap- proved the merger, save for Svandís Svavarsdóttir from the Left Green party, who did not vote. News of the meeting and specifi- cally news that key staff were being given special stock options blew up in the media. The majority govern- ment between the Independence and Progressive parties collapsed. A new majority, dubbed ‘The 100 Day Majority’ took over. A steering committee headed by Svandís Sva- varsdóttir began investigating the events that led up to the merger and proposed to City Council that the merger be thwarted.
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