Reykjavík Grapevine - 07.10.2011, Qupperneq 19

19
The Reykjavík Grapevine
Issue 16 — 2011
presidency in 1979, before the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the dete-
rioration of relations that followed. In
the 1984 presidential elections, Walter
Mondale tried to use this against Rea-
gan, asking why he was the first presi-
dent since Hoover (1929–33) not to meet
with a Soviet leader. “They keep dying
on me,” quipped Reagan.
This was, in fact, true. During his
first term, Reagan had been faced with
four different General Secretaries of
the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. First the ailing Brezhnev, then
Andropov, later Chernenko and finally
Gorbachev. A Spitting Image spoof
showed Reagan outrunning his adver-
saries like the Duracell bunny in an ad
that was in heavy rotation at the time.
Reagan turned 70 the year he took of-
fice, but compared to the Soviet leaders,
he seemed to represent the vigour of the
Western world as compared to the East-
ern Bloc.
REAGAN’S BIG PREMIERE
By 1985, when the first Superpower
summit for six years was scheduled in
Geneva, things had changed. Reagan,
by now 74, was showing signs of ag-
ing, whereas Gorbachev was at the top
of his game at 54. This greatly worried
Reagan’s aides, who spent a great deal
of time preparing the President. Reagan
approached this as he did most things, as
a role to be played, and had his foremost
Russia expert play the role of Gorbachev,
speaking in Russian with an interpreter
at hand. He also had cards prepared
with the most important information
regarding nuclear weapons, cards that
the sometimes dropped, whereas Gor-
bachev was comfortable keeping details
in his mind. In the evening Reagan
watched Russian movies with his wife
Nancy upstairs from the Oval Office,
and the night before the big meeting, he
prayed to God that he was ready.
The Geneva summit did not produce
any major results. The one decision
reached was that Gorbachev would go
to Washington for another meeting and
that Reagan would go to Moscow in re-
turn. Before times and dates could be
set, a surprise announcement was sent
out in 1986. Another meeting would be
held, not in either of the capitals, but in
five hours f lying time of each. This was
not seen as a full-blown summit, but
rather as an informal warm up before
the major events. The place was Reykja-
vík, the topic of discussion was nuclear
missiles, and world history was very
nearly changed.
ICELAND AND NATO
Iceland, despite trading with the Eastern
bloc more than any other country (com-
paratively), had proved a pliant NATO
ally. The US Naval Base in Keflavík was
an important source of foreign currency,
with permission to provide goods and
services to the Americans (usually at
exorbitant prices) given to a select few
members of the usually in-charge Inde-
pendence and Progressive parties.
This was spoofed in the annual New
Year’s Eve comedy show at the end of
1986. In it, Reagan arrives in Keflavík
to a red carpet reception, whereas Gor-
bachev is detained in customs on sus-
picion of smuggling vodka and furs to
Iceland. Another source of mirth was
the first and heretofore only act of terror-
ism in Iceland, when Sea Sheppard sank
a couple of whaling ships in Reykjavík
harbour.
It was not just Icelandic comedy writ-
ers who took note. The world’s press
descended on Reykjavík and camped
outside Höfði House, where the meet-
ing was taking place. For two days few
reports emerged, while Reagan slept at
a US embassy building and Gorbachev
stayed in a Russian ship in Reykjavík
harbour. Most of the remaining time
was spent behind closed doors. Reagan
sought to discuss human rights in the
Soviet Union, the rights of Jews and
dissidents to emigrate and the war in
Afghanistan, but Gorbachev wanted to
limit the discussion to nuclear weapons.
REAGAN’S GAME
Reagan’s relationship to nuclear weap-
ons was complex. In the 1970s, he had
severely criticised Nixon’s policy of dé-
tente with the Soviets. In 1976, when
asked how he would respond to North
Korea taking 37 American hostages if he
were President, he said he would nuke a
North Korean city every hour until the
hostages were released.
During his first term as President,
he had escalated the arms race by plac-
ing medium range Pershing missiles
in Western Europe, leading to massive
peace protests including a million man
march in Central Park. Nevertheless, he
seemed at the same time vary of nuclear
weapons. His supporters say it was the
responsibility of office, which proved to
him the perils of nuclear war, which was
just a push of a button away. His detrac-
tors would rather say it was his Christian
worldview. Reagan once warned a Sena-
tor that according to the Bible, Armaged-
don would start in the Middle East and
the Russians would be involved. Perhaps
he simply did not want his presidency to
culminate with the End of Days?
Whatever the reason, Reagan soon
came up with a plan to render nuclear
weapons useless. In 1983, he announced
a plan to destroy incoming missiles with
the aid of satellites in space. This was
known as the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive or SDI, but journalists soon dubbed
it “Star Wars,” for obvious reasons.
When asked whether this might not
tempt the Americans into attacking first
if they no longer needed to fear reprisals,
he offered to share the technology with
the Russians. This plan seemed non-
sensical to many and prompted some to
worry that the Soviet leader might trick
him into giving up the US’s nuclear de-
terrent. Many argued that Gorbachev
was just another leader trying to spread
world communism by different means.
At the very least, the hawks in his ad-
ministration wanted any deal on nuclear
weapons to be linked to a deal on con-
ventional weapons, where the Soviets
had superiority.
GORBACHEV’S GAME
Gorbachev had reasons of his own for
wanting arms control. More than a year
after taking office, his economic re-
forms had not achieved many concrete
results. People still had money, but there
was nothing to buy. A campaign against
alcoholism had led to him destroying
some of the Soviet Union’s wine acres,
while pushing alcohol sales under-
ground and depriving the state of bil-
lions of dollars in revenue. At the begin-
ning of the year, the Chernobyl reactor
exploded in Ukraine, proof to some that
the Soviet Union was rotten right to its
nuclear core. Defence was eating up as
much as 20% of the Soviet budget. An
arms limitation agreement would not
only give him clout at home, but also
free up funds for use elsewhere in the
economy. Many of his hard-line critics,
however, were worried that he was weak
and would surrender the Soviet Union’s
nuclear deterrent to the enemy.
Gorbachev had been candid when
the two first met at Geneva: “You ask
what changes in the world economy
could be of benefit to the Soviet Union.
First of all, an end to the arms race. We
would prefer to use every rouble that
today goes for defence to meet civilian,
peaceful needs.”
Gorbachev showed an open hand;
Reagan kept his cards close to his chest.
Before the meeting, he wrote a memo to
himself that said: “How about just hang-
ing back until we get some of the things
we want instead of giving consideration
up front to what they want?”
The stage was set for a historic meeting,
but who was conning whom?
’THE SPIRIT OF REYKjAVíK’
Many stories circulated about the Höfði
meeting, and not all of them involved
the ghosts of diplomats and writers that
allegedly inhabit the house. While the
two leaders met alone with their scribes
and translators, every other room in
the small mansion were taken up by
other negotiators who went on well into
the night, including Secretary of State
George Schulz and Soviet Foreign Min-
ister Eduard Shevardnadze. Even one of
the two bathrooms was used as an office,
with the toilet seat serving as a table.
Everyone seemed caught up in the
moment. Gorbachev wanted to cut the
number of nuclear missiles in half, but
this was topped by Reagan who sug-
gested getting rid of them altogether.
The meetings were scheduled to go on
for two days, but a third day was added.
This might even have stretched on, had
Reagan not promised Nancy to be home
in time for a late dinner, and his aides
knowing better than to argue. Had she
been there, as Gorbachev’s wife Raisa
was, more time might have been allo-
cated to nuclear disarmament.
The process was gruelling. James
Mann, a professor at Johns Hopkins
University and Reagan biographer, says:
“Sitting in a meeting with Reagan
required patience—sometimes more
patience than Gorbachev possessed.
Reagan told anecdote after anecdote.
He quoted from letters he claimed to
have received. He repeated the same
phrases and lines over and over again,
never going beyond them or explaining
their particular relevance to the point at
hand.”
National Security Council adviser
Rudolf Perina adds:
“In general, Gorbachev thought
he was clearly smarter than Reagan…
Sometimes, when Gorbachev made a
clever point, he would look around the
room, in the vain hope that there would
be some audience there to recognise his
superior intelligence. But there was no
one there but the notetakers, who would
avert their eyes and go back to their
notes.”
By the end, Gorbachev proposed a
0-0 solution: getting rid of all short and
medium range missiles in Europe. In
addition, he wanted to cut the amount
of long-range missiles in half, but he
still wanted to keep a hundred medium
range missiles in Asia, no doubt in case
there were problems with the Chinese.
Reagan agreed in principle, and even
proposed to get rid of all nuclear mis-
siles in ten years. There was just one
little snag: SDI, or “Star Wars”.
Gorbachev wanted a ten-year ban on
the testing of SDI. Reagan refused, but
offered to share it. Gorbachev said he
doubted this, as the US was not even
prepared to share oil-drilling technol-
ogy. Finally, Reagan accused Gorbachev
of turning down a historic opportunity
because of a single word. Gorbachev said
it was a matter of principle. It could go
no further.
Bemused Icelanders looked on as the
two world leaders departed. “That didn’t
go too well,” said a local correspondent
to a taxi driver on the way home. “No, I
didn’t make nearly as much money as I
thought,” answered the cabbie.
‘THE CURSE OF REYKjAVíK’
Gorbachev may have been the smarter
man, but Reagan had the deeper pock-
ets. Gorbachev desperately needed a
deal. Reagan wanted one, but did not yet
need one. So, no deal was made. Both
returned home to little acclaim, even if
Reagan’s spin machine did its best to
herald it as a triumph, and the President
gave an Orwellian speech at the Kefla-
vík Naval base where he said he would
never surrender the free world’s ability
to defend itself.
Was there some sort of Reykjavík
curse operating, particularly when it
came to Russians? 14 years previously,
Boris Spassky had returned home to dis-
grace. Fischer received a hero’s welcome
and adulation that he spent the next de-
cades squandering, until finally Iceland
was the only country that took him in.
Before the year was over, Reagan
was having serious troubles of his own.
He had been selling weapons to Iran in
exchange for the release of American
hostages by Hezbollah, and in turn used
the money to arm Contra revolutionar-
ies against the elected government of
Nicaragua. It was the biggest scandal
since Watergate, one that threatened to
bring down his presidency. Meanwhile,
the crack on Wall Street in 1987 belied
the idea that Reaganomics was bringing
prosperity to the nation.
Time Magazine wrote at the time:
“…the Administration could be hard
pressed to find a subject that will com-
pete for the public’s attention. An arms
treaty with the Soviet Union, signed at
a summit conference in the US with
Gorbachev undoubtedly represents Rea-
gan’s best opportunity to surmount his
difficulties and crown his tenure in the
White House.”
The President seemed to take their
advice.
AN ACTOR’S TECHNIqUE
This would have been an excellent time
for Gorbachev to negotiate terms, had
his own situation not gone from bad to
worse. The Soviet deficit was now reach-
ing 100 billion dollars, up from virtually
zero a decade before. Reagan routinely
ran deficits topping 200 billion, but his
credit rating was better. Both were burn-
ing up vast sums of money on the arms
race, but the United States had more
money to burn. Gorbachev had to come
to terms. He would go to Washington.
In Reykjavík, right between Moscow
and Washington, as the song goes, the
two men had tried to negotiate on even
terms. It was symbolic that it took Gor-
bachev going to his adversary’s home
turf to hammer out a deal largely on
Reagan’s terms, proving right Reagan’s
vision as to how the Cold War would
end: “We win, they lose.”
The negotiations were later spoofed
by Harvard historian Marshall I. Gold-
man. Reagan was notoriously hard of
hearing, so his aids usually had to leave
the room when he cranked up the vol-
ume of the TV (although even Reagan
had to hold the receiver away from his
ear when an angry Margret Thatcher
was on the other end). In Goldman’s
words:
“…given Reagan’s hearing problem, Rea-
gan may well have asked, “What did you
say?”
“Okay, I will destroy two or three
missiles for every one the United States
destroys,” answered Gorbachev.
“What did you say?”
“Okay, I will agree to mutual inspec-
tion.”
“What did you say?”
“Okay, I will withdraw Soviet troops
from Afghanistan as well as Eastern Eu-
rope, reduce the size of the army and cut
Soviet aid and interference in the Third
World.”
A more accurate, if no less colourful
description from Reykjavík, sounds like
this:
“A Russian note-taker who watched
Reagan closely in two summits told Jack
Matlock (the US Soviet expert) that the
American reminded him of an old lion,
lazily watching an antelope on the hori-
zon, taking no interest, dozing a bit. He
doesn’t move when the antelope stops
only ten feet away, that’s too far. At eight
feet, the lion suddenly comes to life. Rea-
gan, the negotiator, suddenly fills the
room.”
Gorbachev was not the only one to
bear the brunt of Reagan’s negotiating
technique. In the words of Reagan biog-
rapher and USC scholar Richard Reeves,
Tip O’Neill, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, “thought the President
always grabbed a little bit more after a
deal was made. The President, who had
once negotiated contracts as president
of the Screen Actors Guild, considered
himself a shrewd bargainer. O’Neill
agreed with that, and he did not like it
one bit.”
GORBACHEV‘S WAR
The Soviets had invaded Afghanistan
in December 1979. This led to a sub-
stantial worsening of East-West rela-
tions, the West boycotting the Olym-
pic Games in Moscow in 1980 and the
Eastern Bloc boycotting the Olympic
Games in LA in 1984. More covertly,
massive military assistance was being
sent to Afghanistan.
The Soviets had been busy mak-
ing enemies, and by the 80s every-
one from Israel to Pakistan to Saudi-
Arabia to China, not to mention the
United States and its NATO allies all
chipped in to arm groups that would
later become the Taliban and Al-Qae-
da. Pop culture did its part too, with
James Bond and Rambo going off to
take part in the Jihad. In 1986, Gor-
bachev had announced a partial with-
drawal, but it would take more than
two years for the superpower to fully
withdraw. The war in Afghanistan is
still ongoing, with slightly different
players.
REAGAN’S WAR
Reagan had invaded Grenada and
sent the Marines to Lebanon, but by
US Presidential standards, his accu-
mulated body count was slight. His
most protracted war was with Colo-
nel Qaddafi of Libya. In 1986, Libyan
agents blew up a disco in West Berlin,
which was frequented by American
soldiers. Reagan responded by bomb-
ing Tripoli.
As with most major events, this
too could be traced to Iceland. In the
mid-70s, Iceland had unilaterally en-
larged its sea boundary to 200 miles,
prompting a Cod War with the Brit-
ish. The Royal Navy was sent on the
scene, but no shots were fired. Qad-
dafi attempted to do the same in 1981,
but the US Navy said it would only
respect the 12-mile boundary. Qad-
dafi threatened to destroy anything
that entered into his 200-mile limit,
which he called a “Zone of Death, and
sent out fighter jets against the Amer-
icans, two of which were shot down.
The war with Libya is still ongo-
ing, with largely the same players.
Continues on page 23