Reykjavík Grapevine - 04.12.2015, Blaðsíða 8

Reykjavík Grapevine - 04.12.2015, Blaðsíða 8
I C E L A N D 4 D U M M I E S 8 The Reykjavík Grapevine Issue 18 — 2015 Politics | Bright?TERROR | Ice-Sis When did you start following the activities and communications of Daesh? I was working full-time when they emerged, and I was immediately fas- cinated, because they were active in my region, and I was very interested in political Islam. The news made it look like Daesh was an unstoppable army, marching across the desert. The truth of the matter is actually much differ- ent [more on this later]. The Interior Minister recently stated that there is no doubt that the terror threat in Iceland has increased. Meanwhile the police, which is overseen by that very minister, says that the threat has not really increased at all. Who's got it right here? I think the police's interpretation is closer to the truth. Iceland, frankly, is a pretty shitty target. There's a reason why Daesh didn't attack Bretagne or Normandy. They attacked Paris, be- cause it's symbolic. It's the heart of the French empire. The thing about Daesh is that they're not primarily focused on over- seas missions. I mean, one of the rea- sons why I communicated with them is because I was trying to find out if rumors that were circulating last year were true, that there was an Icelander involved in making their videos. So one of them went on a mission for me to find out. He was actually kind of nice about it. He reported back and said he had been to the camp where they keep the foreign parties, and none of them had met any Icelanders. They'd met Norwegians, Swedes and Danes, but no Muslim Icelanders. So at least ac- cording to that guy, no, Daesh has no interest in Iceland. How did you come to communicate with Daesh? I started by going on the Dark Web, but my biggest success was when I broke through on Twitter. I follow like 200 of these guys on Twitter. And they're always changing their accounts. I talked to them using PGP encryption. They have that, and they have their own encryption software, so they can talk to each other without being spied on—everything is instantly deleted, so there's nothing left on their comput- ers. But most of my communications were done through private messaging on Twitter. I'd see someone posting a photo of themselves with a gun, and I'd message them saying, "Would you add me so we can PM?" And a lot of them did. Did you tell them you were a reporter? I didn't specifically mention it, but it was in my profile bio, so anyone who looked at it could know. I made sure to address them very formally, using all the traditional greetings. I never expressed any opposition, you know, "How could you do this?" That's a dead end. So I basically just tried to ask them what life was like, where they came from, things like that. I de- veloped quite a rapport with a few of them. Mostly the Westerners, the Eng- lish ones especially. They were mostly very young men, in their twenties and late teens. I could understand if you're a Sunni in the region, being oppressed by Shia forces, and then these guys roll in and liberate you. But why would someone in, say, Birmingham, want to join up with Daesh? I believe it's a mixture of things. A lot of these guys grew up in a culture where they're alienated. They have much, much worse chances of getting a job than anyone else. In rare cases, they're well-educated, but have grown embittered with life. Imagine living in a tenement flat somewhere. You don't have a job, your parents are drinking, you want to have some kind of identity. You start reading the Koran, you start watching online lectures about jihad. And then this opportunity arises: you can go to Syria, you can carry a gun, you can lead a bri- gade of men, victo- riously holding up your enemy's head like you're in some kind of video game. You get women, you get a free house, everything you need. All of the sudden, you're somebody. And af- ter you die, you go to Heaven. If you take a good look at Daesh, you'll see very few of them are older than 30. And you don't really develop an appre- ciation for your own mortality until after the age of 30. But a lot of us have had rebellious phases. Maybe even most of us. Very few of us will decide to engage in jihad. What do you think of the religious angle to this? One of the things that struck me most about them was their use of Arabic slang. They all use the same Islamic slang for certain concepts and they were really—I'm going to get beheaded for this—but they really sounded like poseurs. They didn't really know much about Islam. They didn't read Arabic. They hadn't gone to mosque as chil- dren. There's no depth to it. One of the things I keep seeing popping up is that no one hates Daesh more than other Muslims, and the best thing we can do to help Daesh is slam the door shut in the face of Syrian refugees. Absolutely—the thing that would help Daesh the most is if we were to shut the door on refugees. You're feeding the problem, and creating a lot of disenchant- ment and anger. If you let in the refugees, you're not risking that much, because there are much stronger checks on refugees than there are on people coming into Europe on a normal visa. Getting a visa is not that difficult, com- pared to getting refu- gee status. So exactly how powerful are Daesh, anyway? I think their military capacity is vastly overrated. For example, when they took Mosul in Iraq, and captured most of the military equipment that the Americans had left behind, there were like ten or twenty thousand Iraqi regulars in Mosul, and maybe five or six hundred fighters from Daesh. But what Daesh did was, in the days before they assault, they started sending mes- sages to the soldiers stationed in Mo- sul, with all these pictures of people being decapitated and castrated, say- ing: "This is coming for you next week." And they knew this annual sandstorm was imminent, which blankets every- thing. You can't see anything. They launched their strike in the middle of a sandstorm, firing off missiles indis- criminately, blowing everything up. The Iraqis thought they were facing thousands of people, so they put down their guns and left, and Daesh just ba- sically took over without a fight. They operate like this. They're not actually really competent fighters. What kind of endgame do you see here? I don't think we can end this until we get to who's funding this, but there's just so many connections. So it's go- ing to take that, as well as infantry on the ground backed up by low-flying aircraft. But nobody's willing to do that, because Daesh have these TOWs [shoulder-launched missiles] that are American-made and probably Saudi- supplied. They're not sufficient to shoot down an airliner at 30,000 feet, but then can take down a low-flying plane. So what we need is an infantry with close air cover from someone who's not afraid to take some casual- ties. And in the western world, there is no army that's willing to take casual- ties. Supplying arms to the people al- ready fighting isn't going to work, be- cause the lines are moving so quickly, and Daesh end up stealing arms caches intended for others. Maybe I'm mak- ing this unnecessarily complicated, but what we have here is a proxy war that serves the puppet-masters quite well, and no one's willing to go in there and do what needs to be done. It's a relatively simple proposition, but what comes after that, God only knows. Com- plete chaos. I think it's going to be a clus- terfuck for a number of years to come. “I’m Going To Get Beheaded For This” Journalist Gunnar Hrafn Jónsson is a reporter for the na- tional broadcasting service, RÚV, where he specializes in international news. Gunnar has a particular interest in the Middle East. He is also the only journalist in Iceland who has actively communicated with actual members of Daesh, also known as the Islamic State. As prominent Icelandic politicians, including the nation’s president, increasingly re- sort to referencing Daesh in their rhetoric, we thought we should learn more about the group and its possible plans for Iceland. Rather than relying on speculation from armchair generals, we went to the one known person in Iceland who’s actually spoken to Daesh. by PAUL FONTAINE Photo by ANNA DOMNICK “They didn't really know much about Islam. They didn't read Arabic. They hadn't gone to mosque as children. There's no depth to it.”
Blaðsíða 1
Blaðsíða 2
Blaðsíða 3
Blaðsíða 4
Blaðsíða 5
Blaðsíða 6
Blaðsíða 7
Blaðsíða 8
Blaðsíða 9
Blaðsíða 10
Blaðsíða 11
Blaðsíða 12
Blaðsíða 13
Blaðsíða 14
Blaðsíða 15
Blaðsíða 16
Blaðsíða 17
Blaðsíða 18
Blaðsíða 19
Blaðsíða 20
Blaðsíða 21
Blaðsíða 22
Blaðsíða 23
Blaðsíða 24
Blaðsíða 25
Blaðsíða 26
Blaðsíða 27
Blaðsíða 28
Blaðsíða 29
Blaðsíða 30
Blaðsíða 31
Blaðsíða 32
Blaðsíða 33
Blaðsíða 34
Blaðsíða 35
Blaðsíða 36
Blaðsíða 37
Blaðsíða 38
Blaðsíða 39
Blaðsíða 40
Blaðsíða 41
Blaðsíða 42
Blaðsíða 43
Blaðsíða 44
Blaðsíða 45
Blaðsíða 46
Blaðsíða 47
Blaðsíða 48
Blaðsíða 49
Blaðsíða 50
Blaðsíða 51
Blaðsíða 52
Blaðsíða 53
Blaðsíða 54
Blaðsíða 55
Blaðsíða 56
Blaðsíða 57
Blaðsíða 58
Blaðsíða 59
Blaðsíða 60
Blaðsíða 61
Blaðsíða 62
Blaðsíða 63
Blaðsíða 64

x

Reykjavík Grapevine

Beinir tenglar

Ef þú vilt tengja á þennan titil, vinsamlegast notaðu þessa tengla:

Tengja á þennan titil: Reykjavík Grapevine
https://timarit.is/publication/943

Tengja á þetta tölublað:

Tengja á þessa síðu:

Tengja á þessa grein:

Vinsamlegast ekki tengja beint á myndir eða PDF skjöl á Tímarit.is þar sem slíkar slóðir geta breyst án fyrirvara. Notið slóðirnar hér fyrir ofan til að tengja á vefinn.