Gripla - 20.12.2009, Blaðsíða 102

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hjálmur also explores (1985, 23) a contrast between “romantic” and “human­
istic” interpretations of saga morality: the romantic mode focusing on the
intrinsic qualities of singular individuals (notably the “heroic” individuals),
and the humanistic mode (following Hermann himself) on the moral
qualities of deeds in these action­packed tales. Both methods of moral
interpretation present difficulties, according to vilhjálmur. I think he
would be especially dubious about reducing saga culture to a mere “clash of
civilizations,” where distinct pagan and Christian ideologies are locked in
single combat. to be sure, there is plenty of combat to be found in these
pages; but the protagonists are best not confused with static, abstract belief
systems.
Vilhjálmur explains why we should understand values in the sagas as
complex and evolutionary – no less so than the political, legal, and social
systems in which they are embedded. He warns against reducing moral
actions to either abstract belief systems or mere sociological functions. to
be sure, the sagas are deeply concerned with moral issues, and these issues
cannot be isolated from the social structures in which they develop. But
moral actions portrayed in the sagas occur within a specific horizon of
social possibilities, the contours of which stand outside the control of
moral choice. Moral actions and social structures are thus distinct but
mutually interacting features of a common culture (vilhjálmur Árnason
1991). The actions of saga characters acquire moral significance within the
boundaries of social possibilities, which are often implied or tacitly invoked
in the delicate balancing of saga narrative. vilhjálmur calls for a different
kind of moral reading from the romantic or humanistic scholars of earlier
generations. His approach treats sagas as a mode of self­reflection on ten­
sions between situational moral choices and the social or political order
under which moral problems arise. One can say that morality is present in,
but distinct from, a field of social possibilities – a condition vilhjálmur
appropriately compares to the Hegelian concept of Sittlichkeit (1991, 163).
As this self­reflective culture passes through four centuries of develop­
ment, we can assume that moral possibilities appear within a constantly
changing horizon. And as sagas flourish during the final century of the
commonwealth era, they scrutinize the virtues of prior centuries under the
inevitable strain of an ever-present “law of unintended consequences.”
Examples of how saga narratives convey this form of commentary can be