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own, which emphasize the relation of saga morality to the social structure
and play down the role of religious and other conscious moral ideals.
Kristján writes: “any significant ethics must rest on metaphysical presup
positions and I am of the opinion that the sagas are shot through with at
least one: ideas about freedom and necessity.” He argues that the “morality
of the saga heroes can only be understood as reactions to outer necessity
and inner freedom.”45 Kristján rejects the view that the saga characters act
unreflectively and takes the words of Gunnarr á Hlíðarendi about his rela
tive reluctancy to kill people as an example of moral reflection. kristján
writes: “Indeed saga characters are constantly reflecting upon, hesitating,
rejoicing over or regretting their deeds. And in at least one area their moral
ideas had profound metaphysical underpinnings, namely, in the upholding
of a view about destiny and free will … a kind of Stoic fate-leads-the will
inganddragsthereluctant attitude to their destiny.”46 kristján argues that
the objective style of the saga narrative is delusive in this regard, by neither
delving into the depths of the human soul and emotional life nor telling
about the complex philosophical ideas the characters had about the nature
of the universe.
In his introduction to Njáls Saga, Þorsteinn Gylfason considers the role
of fate and concludes that there is no fatalism in the saga: “Generally
speaking, not a single action of any consequence is presented in Njála as
being necessitated by fate or planned by any external power.”47 This word
ing shows how radically the notion of fate is decontextualized because the
Icelandic fate is interwoven with self-understanding and immanent world
view but does not have an explicit reference to external power. Much in
the way as Þorsteinn argued that the fundamental moral notions of Njála
are shared by us, he states that the author of Njála “conceives of gæfa and
ógæfa in the same ways as we do. Hence it is only through an overinterpre
tation of these words that scholars have been able to read fatalistic beliefs
into them”.48 fate plays little or no role in Byock’s interpretations of
actions in the sagas. In light of the emphasis he places on “the choice that
45 kristján kristjánsson, “Að geta um frjálst höfuð strokið,” Þroskakostir (Reykjavík:
Rannsóknastofnun í siðfræði, 1992), 169 and 172. My translation.
46 kristján kristjánsson, “Liberating Moral traditions,” 406.
47 Þorsteinn Gylfason, “Introduction” to Njal’s Saga, xxiv.
48 Ibid., xxiv.
An etHoS In tRAnSfoRMAtIon