Gripla - 20.12.2009, Síða 39

39A MutAtInG PeRIPHeRy
veldi”). But it was an oligarchy with a difference. Its architects had to come
to terms with the fact that the settler community was a “bad material for an
obedient underclass” (Ibid., 120). If the project had aimed at containing the
ethos of individualism and equality within a power elite, the result showed
that it had to be accommodated on a much larger scale. nordal argues that
the chieftains who embarked on state building must have expected their
power to grow, and to translate into effective taxation (Ibid., 120). That did
not happen; they had to settle for a modus vivendi that may be described as
an “aristo­democracy” (Ibid, 120), and for a leadership role built on very
fragile foundations.
If this interpretation is accepted, it seems compatible with Jesse Byock’s
analysis of “proto-democratic tendencies” at work in Icelandic society
(Byock 2000, 65). But his claim that “farmers collectively retained control
over coercive power” (25) seems to go too far, and so does the reference to
a “prototype democracy in action” on the back cover of the book (I do not
know whether the latter formulation fully reflects Byock’s views). In
Nordal’s view, the Freestate was not a democracy: it was a half-thwarted
oligarchy, a historical stalemate that perpetuated itself for a remarkably
long span of time (if it was a “masterpiece” (Ibid., 120), it was an uninten­
tional one). the uneasy combination of typological labels – aristocracy,
oligarchy, democracy – reflects the complexity of the phenomenon in
question, rather than any inconsistency of the argument. nordal’s difficul­
ties are comparable to those of historians dealing with the early polis: its
oligarchic character is undeniable, but so is the presence of aristocratic
ambitions and networks that often clashed with oligarchic institutions, and
it is still a hotly debated issue whether – or to what extent – the early polis
prefigured democracy. But whatever view we take of parallels and differ­
ences at the beginning, there is a massive contrast between later develop­
ments of the two political formations. The democratizing dynamic that
unfolded in some of the Greek poleis – and triumphed in the most impor­
tant one – has no parallel in the history of the freestate. Its key institu­
tions underwent some reforms, but there seems to be no reason at all to
link them to democratizing trends or pressures. the changes that – in the
end – damaged the Freestate beyond repair began much later and were of
a very different kind: a new oligarchic offensive upset the institutional bal­
ance and created new realities on the ground.