Gripla - 20.12.2009, Page 248

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of megalopsychia or magnanimity. In a manner analogous to that of
Williams, kristján attempts to “dive in at the deep end”. He does this by
comparing Aristotle’s magnanimous person to the mikilmenni of saga lit­
erature. Honour is central to that account, as it is to saga morality: in both,
“honour and dishonour counted as the external criteria of a person’s
greatness.”23
this attempt to liberate the honour found in saga literature, an attempt
which quite explicitly makes use of analogous attempts within ancient
Greek studies, seems to me incoherent. I turn to it in section IV below.
III. Competition and cooperation
While the idea of there being a chasm between the shame cultures of old
and modern guilt cultures tends to put any relevance of a morality based on
shame and honour beyond retrieval, attempts either to downplay the dif­
ference or even to elevate the morality of shame cultures aim at retrieving
them. the philosophical complexities (pointed out by Bernard Williams)
of the difference between shame and guilt notwithstanding, the emphatic
role played by honour in both ancient Greece and medieval Iceland never­
theless seems to invite a characterisation of both as shame cultures, or
honour cultures. Hence the persuasiveness of sociological accounts that
entrench the morality of honour in social institutions. My misgivings
about this project do not pertain to the general idea of such accounts,
which I find convincing, but only to apparent connotations of the notion
of honour in them.
The social worlds in question are characterised by shame rather than
guilt, or honour rather than conscience, as evidenced by the overriding
importance of honour which is also to be understood as the social force
that determines questions of value. Before venturing further, it is impor­
tant to distinguish shame (aidōs) from the dishonour (atimia) that brings
about the shame; shame in turn causes action for the sake of honour (timē);
hence the social worlds in question are variously called shame- or honour-
cultures. But now the role of honour, we are at least often led to believe,
makes for a competitive social world, in which competitive virtues dominate
23 Ibid., 410.