65° - 01.07.1968, Blaðsíða 27

In answer to this proposal NATO advocates
pointed out that neutrality had been useless in
protecting Iceland and many other countries.
Such policy was only feasible under special geo-
graphic circumstances which Iceland certainly
did not enjoy. It was further pointed out that
there seemed to be a possibility of conflict be-
tween the Soviet Union and the Western Powers.
If war broke out between these states, any agree-
ment them concerning Iceland would be worth-
less and they would both quickly seek to establish
themselves in the country. This might lead to
armed conflict in Iceland, which could be cata-
strophic for the population.
The second kind of opposition to NATO mem-
bership was based more on cultural arguments.
There was a considerable movement of non-com-
munist nationalists, mostly intellectuals, organised
in the TjoSvarnarfelag. The essence of their argu-
ment was that membership in NATO would mean
that foreign troops would he stationed in the
country in the foreseeable future. This, they felt,
would endanger Icelandic nationality. Some of
them admitted that neutrality was no guarantee
against attack or occupation, but such losses could
be recovered. The nation would live even in the
horrible eventuality that half the population were
lost, one speaker said. But it would not survive
if it became a colony and let its body and soul be
occupied by foreign troops.
In response to this it was pointed out that Ice-
land’s membership in NATO was on the condi-
tion that the country should not have to provide
military bases in peacetime. Anyway it was gua-
ranteed that only the Icelanders themselves would
decide what should be their contribution to the
Alliance.
The argument concerning the danger to Ice-
landic nationality was dismissed as an exaggera-
tion. Many noteworthy advocates of this argument
in 1949 have later admitted publicly that the
danger has shown itself to be small compared
with what they feared at the time.
During two decades the arguments pro and
con NATO membership have moved from one
area to another. During the most intense period
of the Cold War there was much talk about
nuclear destruction. Opponents of NATO claimed
that the Defence Force and its base at Keflavik
provided a target which would be among the first
to be attacked with nuclear weapons if war broke
out. No detail was spared in explaining the hor-
rors to the population.
NATO proponents claimed that the small De-
fence Force was only equipped for defence and
was far below the importance needed to become
a nuclear target. It was pointed out that there
were no atomic bombs at Keflavik or elsewhere
in Iceland, nor were there rockets or other of-
fensive weapons. A potential enemy could only
want Iceland to use it as a base for himself and
would, therefore, not destroy its principal facili-
ties. Finally it was pointed out that if there were
no defence in Iceland at the outbreak of war,
both parties would in all haste try to capture the
country. This could lead to fighting in Iceland.
Thus the policy of neutrality and no defence
would lead to the very kind of catastrophe which
the neutralists constantly predicted as a result
of NATO membership.
Iceland’s extension of her fisheries limits to 12
miles led to a serious dispute with some of her
NATO partners, primarily the United Kingdom.
This was, of course, used by NATO opponents
to discredit the alliance in Icelandic eyes and
demand withdrawal.
In reality the membership of both parties to
this dispute in NATO tended to help the Icelandic
cause. In debates within NATO Iceland found
sympathy and friendly mediation, while great
pressure was put on the British to discontinue
the operations of the Royal Navy and later to
make the final settlement, which was widely inter-
preted as an Icelandic victory. Thus NATO mem-
bership was definitely an advantage to Iceland
in solving this important and difficult problem.
This warm Gulf Stream weather went to my head,
that’s all!
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