Reykjavík Grapevine - 09.10.2009, Blaðsíða 45

Reykjavík Grapevine - 09.10.2009, Blaðsíða 45
calculated using the mid rate for the USD/ISK exchange rate as posted on the Central Bank of Iceland’s website at 11:00 2 (two) business days prior to the Closing Date.” To put it in terms that have become alarmingly familiar: Magma Energy will pay ISK 3.6 billion to Reykjavík Energy upfront, with a remaining ISK 8.4 billion provided to Magma as a bullet loan from Reykjavík Energy, with the sole collateral being a bond in HS Orka reissued to Reykjavík Energy by Magma. Also, according to Magma’s financial statements “the bond is repayable in a single instalment in seven years and bears interest at an effective rate of 1.52% per annum.” Magma will repay Reykjavík Energy in US dollars using the Central Bank’s exchange rate according to the strength of the króna at the time of the deal being signed now, in 2009. Magma’s financial statements further state the “purchase of the Company's interest in HS Orka will be financed by cash on hand and the credit facility available to it, or from other sources of capital available to the Company” and that, as of June 30, 2009, cash and equivalents totalled $4.5 million, working capital was $2.7 million and Magma’s undrawn credit was $20 million. This would imply that Magma Energy is some $5 million short of paying even their initial down payment to Reykjavík Energy, contradicting the purchase agreement guaranteeing sufficient liquid assets to complete the transaction and, one would assume, making Magma a poor candidate for a loan for the remaining ISK 8.4 billion. “I’m very sceptical. It reminds me of what has been going on in Iceland before and to see this happen and stuff like them buying a company with a bullet loan and just using shares in HS Orka as collateral,” worries Jón Bjarki. “How the fuck do they do that? It stinks. The whole thing stinks. I just don’t trust these people anymore. I don’t think anything has changed here. John Perkins came to Iceland and he said that what is going to happen is that we are going to start to sell our natural resources away, you won’t realise what’s happening but that’s what happens after crises like this in Iceland. This may be a small step but it’s a very scary step.” Wave the red flags More possible cause for contention, the term of usage rights Magma Energy is purchasing allows for an initial 65 years with the option of renewal for another 65 years. “This poor deal becomes even clearer when we compare it to other contracts that Magma Energy has made,” explains Social Democratic MP Ólína Þorvarðardóttir, referring to Magma’s 10-year term in Nevada with the possibility of extending for another ten. From a purely business perspective Mr. Beaty argues that such a long-term is proof positive that Magma is invested in building as strong and successful a company as possible. He says: “If you’re building a house and you want to have a really nice house and you have a leasehold agreement that gives you ownership rights for your house—if you have a short leasehold agreement you’re going to build a really crummy house because you know that, after a while, you’re not going to own anything. If you have a decent term you’re going to build a nice house and it’s going to run well and be nice to live in.” However some critics of the agreement have their doubts about Magma Energy’s dedication to HS Orka and Iceland. “To my knowledge Magma has plans for maybe five to seven years in Iceland and then they want to exit with good profits,” projected Dagur B. Eggertsson. “So they will probably just sell their 130 year contract for their own profit but not for the profit of the people.” Who is MagMa energy sWeden aB? Magma Energy Corp. and Magma Energy Sweden AB are, essentially, one and the same. The “Sweden AB” suffix was added when it came to light that Magma Energy Corp. was not permitted to purchase shares in Icelandic natural resources because corporations outside the EEA would not guarantee EEA regulation of resources. Thus a Swedish shelf company was established to skirt Icelandic laws. The listed president of said Gothenburg-based shelf company is Lyle E. Braaten, a long-practicing Vancouver based lawyer and secretary and general counsel of Magma Energy Corp. Said Mr. Beaty of this: “It’s legal nonsense that comes out of particular Icelandic laws that say the only companies that can be involved in the Icelandic energy business are European community companies. So Canadians, or anywhere else in the world for that matter, can only get involved by incorporating a subsidiary in the EU.” Due to an agreement between the Canadian and Swedish governments regarding taxation, Sweden was ideal for Magma’s EU P.O. box for the Canadian firm to avoid double taxation. As for Magma Energy’s operation in Iceland being regulated in accordance with the EEA and Icelandic law, Mr. Beaty doesn’t “know that it really matters. Magma is going to be following the best practices that I’ve followed all my career. All kinds of things that are demonstrably at world standards. We’re not interested in raping and pillaging, we’re interested in doing long-term sustainable development and if you can do that in any industry you can do it in geothermal.” This raises concern about the ease with which foreign firms can incorporate themselves within the EEA and the purpose of laws prohibiting non- EEA ownership if they are so easily manoeuvred around. transparency, please Throngs of unanswered questions and intense circulation of rumours surround the Magma Energy deal. Halldór J. Kristjánsson and Finnur Ingólfsson (there’s a name that should ring a bell for those familiar with Icelandic corruption and shady deals) are thought to be involved, and some even suspect Ross Beaty of just being the face of a company being run by Icelandic banksters-cum-green energy enthusiasts, all of which feed the fears of the general public that could be calmed through widespread corporate transparency. Daði Rafnsson, author of the popular Economic Disaster Area blog, while adamant that transparency is the means by which Iceland can rebuild itself as a nation and avoid suspicion, said, “I think it’s going to be really hard. For business here we’re always going to run into situations of knowing somebody on the other side of the table, but too often the same people are on both sides of the table, that seems to be a reoccurring theme. It’s hard to not be connected in some way but people should know about it. That will go a long way in educating people on who to vote for, who to not vote for, who to trust.” iceland’s privatised future In her frighteningly poignant tome Shock Doctrine, Naomi Klein writes “When communities get hit by great shock large corporations and other power blocks use the opportunity to push a pointed policy where public property is given to private parties on a silver platter, for a disgraceful price.” The partial sale of HS Orka to Magma Energy is, undoubtedly, a landmark in Iceland’s political economy, but that is not to say that it is destined to be a precedent. For the time being it appears to have opened a floodgate, as a Chinese aluminium company has shown great interest in the possible acquisition of 32% of the Þeistareykir geothermal plant in Húsavík—their representatives have already met with Húsavík officials to discuss the possible deal. The future of Iceland at this pivotal point in its history is largely dependent on ongoing critical thought by policy makers on the long-term well-being of Iceland’s resources. As Noam Chomsky warns: “Privatisation does not mean you take a public institution and give it to some nice person. It means you take a public institution and give it to an unaccountable tyranny.” For the time being it is likely best that Iceland stops to evaluate its current situation. Many argued that the Magma Energy deal was passed too swiftly, that not enough time was given to contemplate the possible consequences of the foreign privatisation, that the public didn’t know enough or just didn’t care. But contemplation is imperative, the public needs to know and the public must care. Now is not the time to grow complacent. “It’s weird to see what they do and to feel like you can’t really do anything,” bemoans Jón Bjarki. “After the protests this winter, people who were there feel like ‘what can we do? Nothing seems to change no matter what.’ For a period of time people were doing stuff, trying to let their voices be heard, but nothing changes and it all seems pointless. The thing is, there are so many reasons to be against all this but people don’t even know it is happening.” feature | Energy the reykjavík grapevine Issue 16 — 2009 13 fl group, now Stoðir, is an Icelandic investment company, placed under insolvency in September 2008 when its largest investment, Glitnir Bank, was partly nationalised. Other notable investments include the controversial Baugur Group and Geysir Green Energy. FL Group, along with former exec Hannes Smárason, has a complicated history of buying up worthless investments, like Sterling Airlines, and reselling them back and forth among friends to mysteriously turn a profit. geysir green energy is an investment company in the field of geothermal energy established by Icelandic investment company FL Group and Glitnir Bank. It bought the state’s share in Hitaveita Suðurnesja in 2007 when the Independence party put it up for sale. FL Group, Geysir’s owner, had made a hefty donation to the Independence party a few months earlier. Big names in the failed economy, Bjarni Ármansson, Jón Ásgeir Jóhannesson and Hannes Smárason, headed up the company at one time, and it is now run by Asgeir Margeirsson. Magma energy is a new Canadian geothermal company with a Swedish shelf company allowing it to operate in Iceland. It owns 43% of Hs Orka hf. Ross Beaty is the CEO of Magma Energy. He has a long history in the mining industry in Canada and abroad and currently serves as Chairman of Pan American Silver Corp., a leading silver producer. He has extensive experience as an entrepreneur, having started more than fifty companies over the course of his career. halldór J. Kristjánsson is the former co-CEO of Landsbanki, which was taken over by the state in October 2008 and has left the country to deal with their failed Icesave account. In all the speculation surrounding the Magma Energy deal, it is rumoured that Halldór is somehow secretly involved behind the scenes, as he is known to have moved with his family to Canada for a job with an energy company. arctica finance hf is the financial advisory firm that negotiated the deal with Magma Energy on behalf of Reykjavík Energy. All Arctica staff “have in recent years been successful and proud contributors to many of the largest transactions that have taken place in Iceland”… they are also all former financial gurus of Landsbanki. For example, Stefán Þór Bjarnason, Arctica’s CEO, was Head of Corporate Finance at Landsbanki until October 2008. Cast of Characters catharine fulton hÖrÐur sveinsson 6.999$
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