Læknablaðið - 01.06.1961, Blaðsíða 37

LÆKNABLAÐIÐ
69
tathata in Zen Buddism. Chri-
stians refer to the God in man.
Bergson, the french philosopher,
spoke of élan vital, and William
James spoke of that part of the
self which provides „the palpi-
ating inward life“, which Hor-
ney called tlie „real self“.3 And
to round the list, I may mention
that pliilosophers of hiology re-
peat over and over again, in
different ways, that nature
tends to mend, not to end.
This assumption of a human
urge toward health implies cer-
tain beliefs regarding the nature
of human nature. Also, it rais-
es the question of moral issues,
moral responsibility and moral
privilege. If we assume as
human 'beings that this urge
is of our nature, then in being
true to our nature it is our
responsibility and privilege to
fulfill our nature.
Tliese questions regarding
essential human nature and
moral responsibility to one’s
human nature have been seen
in many different ways which
Horney has lucidly described in
her chapter, „A Morality of
Evolution.“ In her last
hook, „Neurosis and Human
Growth“,3) she says, „Broadly
speaking ,there are three major
concepts of the goal of morality
which rest upon these different
interpretations of essential
human nature. Superimposed
checks and controls cannot be
relinquished by anyone who he-
lieves — in whatever terms —
that man is by nature sinful
or ridden by primitive instincts
(Freud). The goal of morality
must then be the taming or
overcoming of the status na-
turae and not its development.
Tlie goal must different for
those who believe that there is
inherent in human nature bolh
something essentially ‘good’
and something ‘bad’, sinful, or
destructive. It will center upon
the insurance of the eventual
victory of the inherent good,
as refined, directed, or rein-
forced by such elements as
faith, reason, will or grace —
in accordance with the parti-
eular dominating religious or
ethical concept. Here the emph-
asis is not exclusively upon
combatting and suppressing
evil, since there is also a posi-
tive program. Yet the positive
program rests either upon
supernatural aids of some sort
or upon a strenuous ideal of
reason or will, wliich in itself
suggests the use of prohibitive
and checking inner dictates.
Lastly, the problem of morality
is again different when we be-
lieve that inherent in man are
evolutionary constructive for-
ces, which urge him to realize
his given potentialities. This be-
lief does not mean that man is
essentially good —- which would
presuppose a given knowledge