Ritröð Guðfræðistofnunar - 01.01.2007, Side 31

fact that I nave delegated my power to representatives and also by the fact
that I am only one out of a multitude of citizens who all share the political
power.
Social Responsibility as a ‘Compromise’ with the Demand
The idea of a politicaJ responsibility without limits, then, rests so to speak
on a confusion between the radicality of the ethical demand, and the condi-
tions of democratic citizenship. But are there no connections at all between
the ethical demand and political responsibility? In fact, I think Logstrup says
there is a connection. He deals with the issue in the very short chapter “Mak-
ing Compromises With the Demand” (Akkorderingen med fordringen).
The starting point of the argument is the claim that natural love fulfils the
demand without the demand being present. The radicality of the demand
consists in its demanding that the very fact of another person’s being under
one’s power should prompt an act of love. But, Logstrup realistically notices:
We do not possess such love, and if we do not possess it, we cannot create it.
The one-sided demand fails to get through to us. (143).
Now, this sounds as if the demand has no effect at all, except maybe to make
it clear to us that our moral life is condemned to failure. Theologically speak-
ing, the demand seems to have only the character of what Luther calls the
theological use of the law. But things are not as simple as that.
Even if we are not able to respond to the demand with unselfish love, there
are situations where
... the demand becomes a claim upon us, a claim so strong that we cannot
wrest ourselves out of its grasp. (143).
This is where compromise with the demand comes in (akkordering med
fordringen). The presence of the demand has the effect that
Though we do not possess love, we do the deed which love would have us do,
albeit for all sorts of other motives. (143).
I think this feature of compromising modifies Logstrup’s claim that the de-