Ritröð Guðfræðistofnunar - 01.01.2007, Side 32

mand is unfulfillable. Even if compromising does not equal fulfilment of the
demand, it could be called observing the demand. Logstrup makes clear that
only some compromise motives could be regarded this way. If the motive is
self-righteousness, the demand is of course distorted. In contrast, the demand
is ‘present’,
... whenever a person who is without love does nevertheless, out of a sense
of responsibility or out of fear, what he believes love would do. Through the
sense of responsibility we are aware of its authority, and the fear is fear of
authority. (145).
By the way, the phenomenon of compromise is what Logstrup later labelled
“morals as substitute”. In any case, we can conclude that even if the demand
is radical, one-sided and unfulfillable, there are ways of observing it. And the
question is whether some such ways can lead to social actions, so that there is
in fact a social-ethical demand.
Logstrup deals with this question in connection with his analysis of the
ethical decision. He explicitly states that the decision is ‘created’ by the de-
mand. And one example he discusses is of political character. It is the deci-
sion that led a few Germans to stand up against the Nazi regime and join the
resistance. This decision was made in what Logstrup calls a critical situation.
The resistance fighters had no part in the crimes of the government and there
was little prospect of success. So why did they choose to risk their lives? Log-
strup answers by asking:
The question is whether a person in the critical situation acts because, con-
sciously or unconsciously, he or she understands that his or her relation to an
absolute authority is of decisive importance to his or her life. (161).
Even if the situation is exceptional, the decision is political. The decision to
join the resistance can be seen as an observation of the obligation that follows
from the sovereignty of the people. Logstrup states somewhat pessimistically
that even if similar actions are called for under normal circumstances, we nor-
mally refrain from acting because we are afraid “that the life which we have
circumscribed and reduced to a system might get out of order” (163). But in
my opinion, Logstrup gives no reason why the ethical demand should not put
the responsibility upon us to seek to remove the miseries of the world as far as
the reach of our power permits.