Fróðskaparrit - 01.01.2002, Blaðsíða 44
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN NORDIC ATLANTIC REGIONS
lands in international negotiations i.e. on
fish quotas.
These unequal starting points for the re-
gions/nations involved in West Nordic Co-
operation explain why the Faroe Islands in
particular have been isolated and margin-
alised from regionalisation by external fac-
tors. Although West Nordic and NORA co-
operation has been a prime Faroese initia-
tive, it may be asked why the Faroe Islands
do not have stronger regionalist policies.
One reason could be that Faroese politics
have been mostly oriented towards internal
regional issues, because of a cultural orien-
tation and a lack of public political debate,
and the Home Rule Government’s strong
commitment to maintain the way of life and
social integration of Faroese villages
(Bærenholdt, 1992; 1994b). The ongoing
value of the “village world” as a term of
reference - but no longer as an organisa-
tional principle of society - has been the
manifestation of an inadequate and under-
developed political culture and lack of pub-
lic involvement (Haldrup and Hoydal,
1994). This is one essential aspect of the
full explanation but not sufficient in itself.
The foreign policy pursued by the Faroe
Islands and Greenland comes under the
auspices of Danish government. Interna-
tional initiatives by the two home rule gov-
ernments have in fact been questioned by
the Danish government, but Greenland in
particular continues to challenge the for-
eign policy monopoly of the Danish gov-
ernment by establishing an offíce of inter-
national relations and foreign policy in the
home rule administration. However, the
foreign policy interests of the Faroe Islands
and Greenland have not been a subject of
major interest to the Danish government,
compared to the very strong interest shown
in regional policies by the Norwegian For-
eign Ministry’s BEAR initiative and its
funding of projects. In fact, there has been
no resistance towards the Faroes’ and
Greenland’s status as non-EU members and
the Danish government has not neglected to
follow up on Faroese or Greenlandic inter-
ests in the EU. In fact, with regard to par-
ticipation and as parts of the Danish Realm,
Greenland and Faroe Islands have effec-
tively been ‘stowaways’ within Denmark’s
membership of the EC/EU. Therefore, this
leaves the Faroe Islands and Greenland
without any possibility of pursuing au-
tonomous monetary policies adapted to the
needs of fisheries policy, whereas Iceland
has been able to use devaluation to adjust
the fisheries sector to the demands of the
world market. In the long run, devaluation
has been much cheaper than the heavy sub-
sidies to the fisheries sector in the Faroe Is-
lands and Greenland. The subsidies are
payed by the Home Rule Governments,
which on the other hand receive transfers
from the Danish state budget. Therefore,
incomplete political competences and cul-
tures have effectively limited the capabili-
ties of the Faroes’ and Greenland’s power
to act effectively within regional initiatives.
The Faroese crisis in the beginning of the
1990s raised several as yet unsettled ques-
tions concerning the system apparent of
home rule government. Constitutionally
unclear delegations of power and responsi-
bility by Denmark to the Faroes is one the
problems that need to be resolved. The