Fróðskaparrit - 01.01.2002, Síða 42

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN NORDIC ATLANTIC REGIONS
are not EU-members (Oliversson, 1995:
10). As such, Nordic Cooperation - and
Nordic Atlantic Cooperation - have always
been characterised by low ambitions, both
in terms of the amount of financial support
received and of the propagation of visions
and symbols for the promotion of NORA’s
identity and viewpoint.
Compared to Nordic Cooperation, Nor-
wegian engagement in the BEAR initiative
is much more in the EU-style: Full integra-
tion of regional and international affairs,
high ambitions, strong financial support,
and the production of symbols, maps, his-
tory etc., giving the Region an image to
project to the outside world. Of course, the
risk of having higher ambitions is that it
leads to high expectations and therefore a
growing feeling of disappointment when
projects do not materialise, especially in
the Russian Federation. The BEAR is
clearly a ‘from above’ initiative, which is
unable to fulfil the demands of neo-region-
alism, nor meet the challenges of tradition-
al cross-border regional policy. BEAR is in
effect a form of foreign policy, although it
has achieved increased awareness of the
Region’s problems and the legitimacy of
further cooperation, through its efforts at
discourse to construct the region (Aalbu et
ai, 1995: 88ff). Whether or not this is an
improvement on the West Nordic/Nordic
Atlantic initiative, where low ambitions
and lack of discursive regional constructive
efforts produce almost no expectations at
all, can be disputed. But there is no doubt
that the stronger international orientalion of
the BEAR is an advantage. This interna-
tional orientation has been provided
through Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
which have been able to engage member
states with the EU. NORA does engage the
Norwegian Ministry of Municipal and
Labour Affairs, but does not engage in any
international relations; their efforts are con-
centrated on internal relationships.
NORA inust be seen in context of the
dominant resistance to the EU in the re-
gions under the Cooperation’s umbrella.
The Faroe Islands have never been a mem-
ber of EU, nor of the European Economic
Area (EEA). Iceland is a member of EEA -
but has never requested EU membership.
Greenland was a member of the EC from
1972 - 85 as Greenland, in spite of an in-
ternal majority of “no” voters, was forced
to join the EC in 1972 as a Danish county.
This was an important factor behind the po-
litical movements which resulted in the in-
troduction of Greenlandic home rule in
1979, followed by Greenland’s subsequent
withdrawal from the EC. The “no”majority
in the 1994 Norwegian referendum on EU
membership was very much a result of
strong resistance from Inland and Northern
Norway. EU-negative and anti-centralist
sentiments in the regions of NORA should
not, however, be a barrier to international
engagement. In fact, Greenland, Iceland,
the Faroe Islands and Coastal Norway are
very much internationally orientated with
regard to business activity. Rather, the bar-
rier to international engagement lies in the
traditional political-administrative division
of responsibility between the Ministries of
Foreign Aflairs and Home Affairs (which
includes regional affairs): Institutions and
Committees within the Nordic Council of