Fróðskaparrit - 01.01.2002, Qupperneq 47

TÝDNINGURIN AV TVØRTJOÐA SAMSTARVI í NORÐURATLANTSØKINUM
45
ing the Cold War) cooperation in the Bar-
ents Sea físheries should not be termed re-
gional cooperation, but cooperation be-
tween nation-states. The post-Cold War
setling of the BEAR initiative could change
this pattern and thereby threaten the exist-
ing regime of this físheries sector which ef-
fectively functions as a ‘closed shop’
(Hoel, 1994: 125). Under the BEAR, re-
gional as well as foreign players could le-
gitimise their future plans as well as their
current activities in these fisheries.
The claiming of regional quotas within
Norway has been raised by several. The
North Norwegian Regional Cooperation
(Landsdelsutvalget for Nord-Norge) has
stated its interests in resource management
and direct fisherjes cooperation with
Northern Russia. At the same time the lce-
landic, Faroese and other fisheries in the
Loophole (Smuthullet), which do not be-
long to any country, highlight the need for
a new system of resource management for
high seas fishing (outside the 200 nautical
mile EEZs). Clarification is also needed in
the case of the Svalbard Zone (EEZ) fish-
eries, claimed by Norway to be under Nor-
wegian jurisdiction with reference to the
Svalbard Treaty, which ostensibly guaran-
tees access to Svalbard resources by all sig-
natories of the treaty (signed by lceland in
1994). However, it appears difficult to re-
solve the conflicts related to ‘third-country
fishing’ via the BEAR initiative, as EU and
states representated distinctly disagree on
the question of extention of management
power of coastal states beyond 200 nautical
miles (Hoel, 1994: 127).
Within processing and marketing, the
potential for regionalisation seems less ob-
vious as dominant trends include an in-
creasing number of direct links between
North Atlantic specialised producers and
supermarket chains. Closer links on the or-
ganisational and social fronts between pro-
ducer and consumer appear to be important
if the North Atlantic físheries industries in-
tend to develop specialised high quality
products from first class raw materials
based mainly on North Atlantic cod and
haddock. The producers could then escape
the dead end of price competition on the
white fish market and in relation to e.g. Pa-
cific Alaskan pollack and similar cheaper
fish species (Jónsson, 1994b). Establishing
a genuine North Atlanlic físh cartel could
have negative effects on innovation, be-
cause cartel organization might undermine
direct producer-user-relations and competi-
lion on innovation between firms. On the
other hand, today’s intra-North Atlantic
price competition for fish also undermines
innovation, as físh sold in large quantities
for low prices obstructs product develop-
ment and capital accumulation in the pro-
cessing industries. Therefore political ini-
tiatives are also needed to reduce internal
competition on the world market. Since
such initiatives must include Russia, the
BEAR could provide a suitable starting
point. In addition, it is important that West
Nordic countries are also included, as to
persuade North Atlantic físhermen about
the rationality of resource management; it
seems essential to include the achievement
of better prices as a part of the same drive.
As cooperation in science and technolo-
gy is a central and apparently already fruit-