Tímarit lögfræðinga - 01.06.1992, Blaðsíða 19

lögreglunnar með skírskotun til orða ensks dómara sem ég tel gera skýran mun á
fagiegri umfjöllun um sönnunargögn og sönnunarfærslu annars vegar og ögun
lögreglunnar hins vegar. Máli sem um ræðir ber tilvísunina: R v Mason [1987] 3
All ER 481, [1988] 1 WLR 139, CA.
Lögreglan hafði sagt sakborningi og lögfræðingi hans að fingraför sakborn-
ingsins hefðu fundist á brotavettvangi. Lögfræðingurinn leiðbeindi síðan eða
ráðlagði sakborningi í samræmi við þetta og játaði sakborningur þá brotið. Fyrir
dómi viðurkenndu viðkomandi lögreglumenn að þeir hefðu spunnið upp það
sem þeir sögðu um fingraförin. Þrátt fyrir þetta hafnaði dómarinn ekki játningu
sakborningsins og var þeirri ákvörðun hans skotið til æðri dóms. Þar segir þetta:
„Watkins LJ: It is obvious from the undisputed evidence that the police practised a
deceit not only on the appellant, which is bad enough. but also on the solicitor whose
duty it was to advise him. In effect, they hoodwinked both solicitor and client. That was
a most reprehensible thing to do. It is not however because we regard as misbehaviour
of a serious kind conduct of that nature that we have come to the decision soon to be
made plain. This is not the place to discipline thepolice. That has been made clear here
on a number of previous occasions.17 We are concerned with the application of the
proper law. The law is, as I have already said, that a trial judge has a discretion to be
exercised, of course on right principles, to reject admissible evidence in the interests of
a defendant having a fair trial. The judge in the present case appreciated that, as his
ruling shows. So the only question to be answered by this court is whether, having
regard to the way the police behaved, the judge exercised that discretion correctly. In
our judgment he did not. He omitted a vital factor from his consideration, namely the
deceit practised on the appellant’s solicitor. If he had included that in his consideration
of the matter we have not the slightest doubt that he would have been driven to an
opposite conclusion, namely that the confession be ruled out and the jury not permitted
therefore to hear of it. If that had been done, an aquittal would have followed for there
was no other evidence in the possession of the prosecution.
For those reasons we have no alternative but to quash this conviction.
Before parting with this case, despite what I have said about the role of the court in
relation to disciplining the police, we think we ought to say that we hope never again to
hear of deceit such as this being practised on an accused person, and more particularly
possibly on a solictor whose duty it is to advise him, unfettered by false information
from the police.“
Reynslan sýnir að dómarar svara sjaldan eða alls ekki gagnrýni sem beinist að
dómsúrlausnum þeirra enda eiga þeir ekki hægt um vik í þeim efnum.
Gagnrýnandinn á þá síðasta orðið og gagnrýni hans getur „verið til þess fallin að
hnekkja virðingu fyrir dómstólunum“.18 Gagnrýni mín, ef gagnrýni má kalla,
snýst ekki um niðurstöður dóma eða dómsúrlausnir. Dómsúrlausnir ber að virða
og taka fullt tillit til þeirra. Skrif mín í þessum kafla beinast gegn orðuðum
17 Leturbreyting greinarhöfundar.
18 Arni Tryggvason: „Aðstaða dómara til andsvara við gagnrýni" Tímarit lögfræðinga 4. hefti 1953.
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