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ÞÓR WHITEHEAD
followers in other countries, was aiming at the domination of all of Europe.
The conditions for reviving neutrality in the form which Icelanders had
hoped for in 1943-44 seemed more and more doubtful. Influential circles in
the three parties were gradually coming to the conclusion that Iceland might
have to insure its external trade and security by relying on cooperation with
the Western powers.
In October 1945, the government of the United States requested permis-
sion for a long-term rental of bases in Keflavík, Fossvogur and Hvalfjörður.
This ill-advised request played into the hands of the socialists and the sup-
porters of traditional neutrality, whose protest movement gained wide-
spread popular support, and thus deprived Icelandic political leaders of the
opportunity to work out their own solution to security matters. The opposi-
tion of the electorate was intertwined with deep-rooted nationalism, which
had been reinforced by the foundation of the republic in 1944. Indeed, the
country's declaration of „perpetual neutrality" had originally been a part of
the declaration of sovereignty in 1918. The American request for bases was
rejected, and the Social Democratic Party, the Progressive Party, and the
Independence Party declared during an election campaign in 1946 that they
would not permit military bases in the country „in times of peace."
After the general election in 1946 an agreement was finally reached on the
abrogation of the Icelandic-U.S. Defense Accord of 1941 and the withdrawal
of U.S. troops from the country. Instead the United States was granted mili-
tary air transit rights at Keflavík airport, and an American civilian contractor
was to run the airfield until such time as Icelanders were in a position to take
over its operation. With this so-called Keflavík agreement, influential figures
in the three parties tried to maintain the security and economic connection
with the Western powers, but within the limits of the above-mentioned de-
clarations and without abandoning neutrality entirely. However, the diffi-
cult adjustment after the high prices received for fish during the war (partly
as a concession from the allies), an ill-considered economic policy, and a new
danger of war required increased cooperation with neighbouring countries to
the west and east. Aid from the Marshall plan and participation in Western
economic cooperation managed to save Icelandic foreign trade from col-
lapse. At the same time the danger of war increased rapidly, and lcelandic
statesmen felt increasingly threatened by the Soviet military might and the
hard core of Soviet supporters at home, as did governments throughout the
hemisphere. The communist take-over in Czechoslovakia in 1948 was of par-
ticular importance in this context, as in the other Nordic countries. The na-
tion's leaders began to have doubts about the defensive value of the Keflavík
agreement and the ability of the Icelandic state to defend its democratic sys-
tem against an internal threat. The problem of defenselessness, which had
been anticipated at the end of the war, made itself acutely felt to the entire
government, especially after a large fleet of Soviet vessels began to fish off
the shores of Iceland in the tense summer of 1948.
lcelandic leaders saw a solution in the conception of an alliance of the At-
lantic powers, which they thought would both strengthen the security of the