Saga - 1991, Qupperneq 123

LEIÐIN FRÁ HLUTLEYSI 1945-1949
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country and assure solidarity among the parties in the government. The
government's reservations about participation in the alliance were shaped
primarily by the insistence of the Progressive party that there be no military
bases „in times of peace." A mission by members of the cabinet to Washing-
ton, D.C., in March 1949 paved the way for Icelandic entry into NATO. The
United States government, on behalf of the founding members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, agreed to the main reservations of the Ice-
landic government, i.e. no military service and no military bases in peace
time. The ministers were fully convinced by the American military that the
country was in possible danger of attack in the first phase of war, and that
this danger could be minimized by conditional entry into the alliance. It can
now be established that the estimate of the danger from attack that the mini-
sters were given in Washington was the same as that which was reckoned in
the war plan of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Iceland's entry into NATO can by no means be ascribed to outside pres-
sure from the western powers. The reasons lie deeper, in the changed strate-
gic position of the country which was the inevitable result of new military
technology, as brought out during the Second World War when the country
played a crucial role in the battle of the Atlantic and in maintaining a line of
air communication over the ocean. The importance of Iceland in the eyes of
the great powers made Icelandic government leaders realize that they could
no longer rely on a policy of neutrality to guarantee the security of a nation
which had no power to defend itself. They had realized this in 1941, made
the necessary adjustments by accepting U.S. military protection, and thus
came out of the war quite well in military and economic terms. After the war,
political pressure at home had forced them to try to return to some sem-
blance of neutrality by the compromise solution inherant in the Keflavík
agreement, but the increased severity of the cold war was putting an end to
that attempt. Ministers were forced to make up their minds whether the na-
tion was in greater danger of attack and military confrontation on its own
territory by entering NATO or by remaining outside it. One thing was cer-
tain: that the country would not be left alone in case of war, since the west-
ern powers were bound to seize it, no matter what happened. The decision
°f the government to make a conditional entry into the alliance took account
°f this. The conditions stipulated that the allies would not get any other fa-
cilities in the country than they had had in the last war — which it was clear
they would take anyway in a new war, by force if necessary. The danger of
a Soviet raid would diminish because of defense plans, which would require
limited participation by Icelanders in peace time (especially the guarding of
Tiain air and naval facilities). Icelandic leaders intended to rely mainly on the
deterrent power of NATO, which they hoped would both prevent war in the
hemisphere and limit further extension by the Soviet Union. By entering the
defense alliance of North America, Britain, two Scandinavian countries and
the leading countries of Western Europe, they considered that they had fixed
a security policy for Iceland which was appropriate to the geographical posi-
hon of the country and its democratic system.