Uppeldi og menntun - 01.01.2003, Blaðsíða 44

ÞEGNSKAPARMENNTUN
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ABSTRACT
The author rehearses some commonly-heard conservative and radical objections to
the idea of citizenship education. He then explores another radical objection, implicit
in the tenets of 'character education' and 'socio-emotional learning' but rarely stated
explicitly. According to this objection, citizenship education politicizes values ed-
ucation beyond good reason, by assuming that political literacy and specific
(democratic) social skills, rather than transcultural moral and emotional basics, are
the primary values to be transmitted. The author explains how this objection is based
on three major disagreements about a) the good and the right, b) pluralism, and c) the
connection between morality and politics.
Kristján Kristjánsson er
prófessor í heimspeki við Háskólann á Akureyri
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