Tímarit lögfræðinga - 01.06.2005, Blaðsíða 29

að.63 Eins og síðar verður nánar rakið virðist hins vegar sem mannréttindadóm-
stóllinn telji rétt að leggja sambærilegan mælikvarða um skýrleika refsiheim-
ildar til grundvallar hvort sem um beitingu lagaáskilnaðareglu 1. mgr. 7. gr. sátt-
málans sé að ræða eða lagaáskilnaðarreglna 8.-11. gr. Það sé hins vegar innan
þess mælikvarða sem mismunandi áhersla og vægi á einstök sjónarmið kunna
að koma fram, allt eftir því hvert samhengið er.
Mannréttindadómstóll Evrópu hefur lagt áherslu á nauðsyn þess að aðildar-
ríkjum sé veitt visst svigrúm við mótun efnislýsinga í refsiákvæðum og við
túlkun og beitingu þeirra í framkvæmd.64 Í nýlegri ákvörðun Mannréttindadóm-
stóls Evrópu í máli Laukkanen gegn Finnlandi er að finna samantekt á þeim
meginsjónarmiðum um inntak og gildissvið 1. mgr. 7. gr. sáttmálans sem lögð
hafa verið til grundvallar í dómaframkvæmd dómstólsins til þessa:65
The guarantee enshrined in Article 7, which is an essential element of the rule of law,
occupies a prominent place in the Convention system of protection, as is underlined
by the fact that no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 in time of war
or other public emergency. It should be construed and applied, as follows from its
object and purpose, in such a way as to provide effective safeguards against arbitrary
prosecution, conviction and punishment.
Accordingly, as the Court held in its Kokkinakis v. Greece judgment of 25 May 1993
(Series A no. 260-A, p. 22, § 52), Article 7 is not confined to prohibiting the retro-
spective application of the criminal law to an accused’s disadvantage: it also
embodies, more generally, the principle that only the law can define a crime and
prescribe a penalty (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and the principle that the
criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused’s detriment, for
instance by analogy. From these principles it follows that an offence must be clearly
defined in the law. In its aforementioned judgment the Court added that this require-
ment is satisfied where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant
provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it, what
acts and omissions will make him criminally liable. The Court thus indicated that
when speaking of ‘law’ Article 7 alludes to the very same concept as that to which
the Convention refers elsewhere when using that term, a concept which comprises
written as well as unwritten law and implies qualitative requirements, notably those
of accessibility and foreseeability (see the Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A no. 316-B, pp. 71-72, § 37).
29
63 Sjá hér m.a. dóm Mannréttindadómstóls Evrópu í máli Groppera Radio AG o.fl. gegn Sviss frá
28. mars 1999. Series A 173, 68. mgr.: „In the Court’s view, the scope of the concepts of foresee-
ability and accessibility depends to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in issue,
the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed“. Um
skýrleikakröfur og afstæða beitingu lagaáskilnaðarreglna 8.-11. gr. Mannréttindasáttmála Evrópu,
sjá Kjartan Bjarni Björgvinsson: „Verðleikar laganna“, kaflar 5 og 6.
64 Ben Emmerson & Andrew Ashworth: Human Rights and Criminal Justice, bls. 284.
65 Ákvörðun Mannréttindadómstóls Evrópu um meðferðarhæfi, Laukkanen gegn Finnlandi frá 1.
júní 2004, mál nr. 48910/99.