Gripla - 01.01.1984, Qupperneq 95

DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE SAGAS
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farmers approached chieftains with whom they were not “in thing” or
other farmers with a reputation for being aggressive. A broker often
acted as a bridge between a person and the successful resolution of his
case; it could be a matter of life or death.
In the sagas brokers such as Snorri goði, Njáll Þorgeirsson, Víga-
Glúmr, Flosi Þórðarson, Helgi Droplaugarson, Höskuldr Dala-Kollsson
and his son Óláfr pái, Guðmundr inn ríki, Gunnarr Hlífarson, and
Mörðr Valgarðsson are marked by their exceptional understanding of
how to manipulate the processes of decision making within their society.
Before becoming involved in a feud or going to court, such individuals
often worked ahead of time to prepare the way for success. For instance,
they reestablished obligations and formed new alliances, thus ensuring
themselves of the support needed to survive the consequences of their
actions. The sagas often contain detailed accounts of the preparations
undertaken by successful brokers to bring about favourable settlements.
An example is the long description of Flosi Þórðarson’s walk through
the East Fjords in search of support for the coming court case after the
burning of Njáll (chs. 133-134).
Successful brokers were distinguished from other less successful
characters such as Gísli Súrsson, Skarpheðinn Njálsson, Gunnarr of
Hlíðarendi, Grettir Ásmundarson, and Hallfreðr Óttarsson. Although
characters in this group usually acted with courage and honor, they
lacked political forethought when becoming involved in feuds. They
failed to develop the type of reciprocal political ties that would allow
them to survive the consequences of their acts. Instead, almost as the
opposite of successful brokers, they tended to act alone, forgetting that
the processes of successful decision making in Old Icelandic society
were tied to a power network. Such characters were usually unsuccessful
in having their violent resolutions legitimated in court. They failed to
perceive that no act of violence in Iceland occurred in isolation from
political life, however justified or honorable it might be.
Icelandic society maintained its stability by limiting violence to acts
that could be resolved through adjustments within the network of obli-
gations which bound Iceland into a social whole. This network, which
focused on local brokers, reinforced an extraordinary governmental
order, one that operated with only minimal chains of authority. Iceland,
with no governmental executive, functioned without the aristocrats or
officials who would have formed a hierarchical chain of command suf-