Íslenska leiðin - 01.11.2003, Blaðsíða 21

Union, began to move toward a more individual
and universal, i.e. Lockean, sense of political
community. But perhaps this was only a temporary
convergence. Not everyone accepted these
changes readily.
In the US, the old ways and beliefs die hard and
many outside the policy elites and a few within
continually attempted to return to earlier, more
traditional American practice. Many Americans still
favor disengagement and isolation. Many favor
acting unilaterally on our principles alone. One
constant, common to those favoring isolation and
those favoring engagement, is that there remains
throughout the foreign policy establishment, and
particularly the defense segment of it, a bias
toward narrow focus on individual parts of complex
political questions.
It is now a commonplace to say that it took t the
events of 9/11 to jolt the Americans back to a
sense of isolation or unilateralism, or some
combination of both, what one might call unilateral
interventionism. I don't think this is so. I think,
rather, that 9/11 was a convenient way to
accelerate what current policy makers already
intended.
To make my case, I go back to March 1994. In the
aftermath of the Cold War there were many
attempts to characterize the new world that could
be emerging. Perhaps we were at The End of
History as Francis Fukuyama, insisted. Or perhaps
we could look forward to the Clash of Civilizations
as Sam Huntington countered. In Washington,
there was a great deal of triumphalism in the
administration of President George Bush. An apex
of that feeling was reached in March 1992 when a
front-page article appeared in the New York Times.
What we saw was a draft of a five year planning
guidance for how the United States should conduct
itself for 1994-1998. Essentially, the guidance said
the US was now the world's sole superpower and
should seize the moment to instill its values
around the world.
In the predictable storm of criticism that ensued,
the Pentagon backed away from this dramatic
assertion. It was just the speculations of a low
level official, one Paul Wolfowitz, insisted the then
Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney. In any event,
the team leader of this group lost the election
eight months later and they were out. But nothing
is ever settled permanently in Washington, or in
most capitals, for that mater. In 2000 most of the
same people were back in the new Bush
administration. They wasted no time in beginning
to implement what had eight years earlier just
been proposed. Thus 9/11 did not cause a change
of direction but a boost in acceleration in direction.
What did change was the identity of the enemy. By
2001, there simply was no state or likely
combination of states that could challenge the
military or technological might of the United
States. Even long-time allies despaired of being
able to operate effectively in the same military
alliance, so far had US capabilities advanced. Yet
there were common enemies as the 9/11 bombers
so amply demonstrated.. A new strategy that
accounted for the both the traditional policy
preferences and the new realities was fashioned.
Writing in Foreign Affairs in late 2002, John
Ikenberry identified seven elements of this new
strategy. The United States, argues Ikenberry, will
maintain its unipolar leadership role against all
others. Next, terrorists -the new enemy - cannot
be deterred so must be eliminated. The end of
deterrence implies a third precept, preventive
wars will be necessary. Further, sovereign states
are accountable for any terrorists using their land
as a base. Partnerships and alliances obviously
constrain this sort of approach so they are less
important. Sixth, the US alone has the capability
and the will to act quickly and decisively in this
new, more dangerous world. And this implies the
seventh pint, international stability for the near
term, cannot be the highest goal.
This assessment explained Afghanistan and
predicted the second Iraq war. But just as the
reality of the Cold War modified the three
characteristics of American foreign policy to some
degree, the realities of Afghanistan and Iraq are
modifying, in a much more rapid order, the new
strategy practiced in this new century. Whatever
the philosophical or theoretical merits of the new
strategic approach, it is proving to be a very
expensive way to do business in the world. It is
evidently far more expensive than its proponents
thought are even now willing to admit. Even
though a consensus on this US strategy as regards
Iraq was forged, there had long been signs of an
obvious divergence between the internationalists,
mostly at the State Department, and the
unilateralists, mostly at the Pentagon and above.
Hints of changes in carrying out the new strategy
— it is far too premature to say abandonment —
are already becoming evident.
What does this mean for Iceland and the United
States? First of all, where does the US see its
priorities? Events in the Middle East have clearly
drawn US attention on military matters away from
the now apparently safe neighborhood of the
Atlantic and Western Europe and toward the "new
Europe" that is now in the process of joining NATO.
At the same time, as it never has been before,
attention is also being given to or demanded by
defense of the United States, or the "homeland,"
itself. Second, given the new strategic assessment
outlined above, regard for and respect of alliances
and mutual agreements has had less of an impact
in some areas of the Washington establishment
than they once did.
For example, the Air Force has long wanted to
bls.21