Íslenska leiðin - 01.11.2003, Blaðsíða 42

Íslenska leiðin - 01.11.2003, Blaðsíða 42
intolerable for the rest of the world, for the permanent five of the Security Council to have that option. China, which also has the power of veto, has yet to ratify the ICC statute. Britain and France may do so, but Russia, China and the U.S. are unlikely to. So it's not just the U.S. There are other major powers that will never submit to it. You talked, a little bit earlier, about the possibility of transforming the powers of the state (executive, legal, judicial) into the international arena. Do you think that it is far in the future or do you think that necessity will create a situation in which we will see an international executive authority? The prime moment for transformation comes at the end of a war, as it did after WWI with the League of Nations and WWII with the United Nations. We may have missed the moment at the end of the Cold War, to accomplish it. The U.S. has seized the moment for unilateral transformation. There have been cases brought before the World Court which asked those judges to find that the Security Council had exceeded its authority under the U.N. charter. That is the power of judicial review which our own Supreme Court does in finding laws of Congress to be unconstitutional. So far the World Court has declined, out of a realistic fear that the Security Council would simply not accept that judgment, by those fifteen jurists. That is a step that could come with some bolder judges in the near future. One of the cases involved sanctions against Libya and the other was the arms embargo on Bosnia. Bosnians had the right to self-defense and the Security Council took that away from them by imposing the arms embargo. In neither of those cases did the World Court proclaim for itself the power of judicial review. You asked about executive power. Of course the Secretary General of the U.N. is not there yet. He has been the errand boy for the major powers, with an occasional Secretary General who was more assertive, Dag Hammarskjöld most notably. The Europeans themselves do not even have a strong executive. As the European Union Constitution is negotiated, that may not be the best thing. We have the strongest executive in any democratic system. In the U.S. the head of state is also the head of government. He is also now a law unto himself in determining the use of military forces, despite what the constitution says. So at the time, when our framers debated the constitution, there was great disagreement on how powerful the executive should be. There are inherent dangers in having too strong an individual in office. Would you describe yourself as an optimist or a pessimist in these matters, for the future? The reason I remain hopeful is out of a conviction that without hope, despair can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you follow Hobbes in believing that human nature is so flawed that the evil impulse will always triumph over the good instinct, it is not realism. That too is a value statement which can encourage people to be more brutal and mean. Whereas if you have faith in the capacity for human reason to solve problems, to make the world a better place, it brings out the best in people and it too can become self-fulfilling. Without hope you lose the vital impulse to apply your reason, to do your best. I believe that saying: "Trust, but verify." I think we need to assume that people we deal with have the capacity to be fair-minded and to be trustworthy. But we also have to be constantly on our guard and to create institutions that provide a systemic check when, as we have learned through history, the weak side of human nature emerges. Excerpt from the Pax Americana lecture: Despite so much incriminating evidence of illegal U.S. economic tactics, I remain unwilling to agree with those who consider economic interests as the sole determinant of U.S. policy. For any nation, including a hegemon, security ranks first, and economic interests are secondary. In third place, I would rank human rights as a U.S. priority in situations where there are no overwhelming political and economic concerns. U.S. Security concerns are genuine, not a pretext. George Bush and his advisers were terrorized by the 9/11 attacks. Four of our Presidents have been assassinated ... The wars on Iraq may have been economically motivated, but the war on Afghanistan was based on genuine fear about national security and outrage. In the Kosovo war I would argue that human rights values were the most significant ... I object to anti-war rhetoric equating George Bush to Hitler or Stalin. The U.S. recent disregard for international law resembles the way other dominant states have behaved when they could get away with it. The Netherlands approach to international law changed after it became a major power with economic interests of the Dutch East India Company. Today Dutch Shell behaves like U.S. multinational corporations. Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has not provided the type of enlightened global leadership that it offered after World War II, but its initiatives have not been totally misguided. Perhaps it is still not too late for the U.S. ... leading a collaborative global effort to remedy the failings of the international legal order ... Clearly this critical lecture by a scholar supported with U.S. government funds indicates the enduring vitality of free speech for Americans ... My lecture today was designed to raise a timeless question that each generation must address anew: "Do the ends justify the means?" I am firmly convinced that U.S. might does not make right, but I have been tempted in cases of genocide to support military intervention for humanitarian ends. bls.42
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