Íslenska leiðin - 01.11.2003, Blaðsíða 22

consolidate its deployed forces but has had little
success overcoming the political importance of
maintaining alliance solidarity which required
leaving forces in place. But now the drain on
forces brought about by wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq has given consolidation arguments new
weight. In this new circumstance, removal of the
fighters at Keflavik looked like a doable
proposition. That such action, especially if done
unilaterally, would strain alliance solidarity, or
even threaten to undo the bi-lateral agreement of
1951, now no longer seemed to matter as much in
the Pentagon. The realization of direct and
immediate threat to the North American continent
also led to a shifting in command responsibilities
in the US (but not NATO) command structure.
Here too, Iceland's importance in US strategic
thinking seemed to be greatly diminished. What,
then, should Iceland do? Turn to Europe?
A closer association with the EU and Europe for
economic and cultural reasons may be in Iceland's
interests or not, as Icelanders decide, but I don't
think turning to Europe for security reasons is a
good idea or even necessary. The EU, despite a
military headquarters project in Brussels and the
agonizingly slow birth of the Eurocorps, or
whatever it will be called, is a very long way from
providing security to anyone who isn't at the other
end of a highway. Even ifthe relevant EU countries
dropped out of NATO's military alliance altogether,
they still would need to spend a lot more money
than any have indicated they would on upgrading
their forces. Development of a capability for
strategic movement of significant forces by air or
sea, for instance to defend Iceland, is a long way
down the list of priorities.
Why Iceland may not even need to think about
turning to Europe for security is the real possibility
that lessons are being learned in Washington.
Going it alone in foreign policy is not only very
expensive, it is likely too expensive. The US needs
allies and that means paying attention first to
those who already are allies. Perhaps it is mere
coincidence but I think the decision not to remove
the fighters, or rather the absence of a decision to
remove them, is one of the early signs of a
growing realization of the need for allies, large or
small, in Washington. Unilateralism, it is becoming
clear, has more costs than benefits. Whatever else
they are, realists, imperialists, fundamentalists,
cowboys, most of the people at the top in
Washington are from the world of business. They
can read a cost-benefit balance sheet.
Sorting out how to proceed with one's security
arrangements, whether one is the greatest power
in the world or one of the two states without any
military at all, is not easy in our world. No one has
ever had the kind of power in so many different
fields that the United States now has. Never before
have so many countries, virtually every one, been
so intimately affected by decisions made in almost
any other part of the globe. Even North Korea,
which has spent the last fifty-five years trying to
ignore the rest of the world beyond its peninsula,
finds it cannot do so. It worries us all but they too
are trying to sort out just what their security policy
should be.
The direction of the future, once so clear in the
Cold War in whose practices and institutions so
many leaders of today were nurtured, is now far
less evident. Long range plans or commitments
may not be the best idea just now. It may not be
a heroic approach to foreign policy, but I think just
muddling through, not making any grand
departures, has a lot to be said for it.
Haraldur Böðvarsson hf,