Íslenskt mál og almenn málfræði - 13.07.1981, Blaðsíða 235

Promises and Games
225
philosophers have often forgotten the simple fact that there are promises
and promises, and that the degree of one’s obligation varies according
to the importance to the promisee of what is promised, how firmly the
promise was made and even such factors as the sacrifice the promiser
has to make and the sensitivities of the promisee. If, in large part, the
source of the obligation to keep ordinary promises is sought in our re-
sponsibility for not disappointing favourable and rightful expectations
the promise has aroused, these features are easily understood.
My suspicion is that the emphasis upon an analogy between games
and so called moral practices, such as the practice of promises, tends to
emphasise the formalistic or “ritualistic” approach I attacked in my
Paper. All promises are made to appear solemn promises, the obligation
to keep which can be determined by reference to clearly formulable pre-
existing rules. In what follows I hope to show that the analogy between
the so called practice of promises and games is somewhat less illuminat-
Jng and helpful than some philosophers seem to believe, and that in
addition to grossly overemphasising the strength of the obligation to
heep a promise, as such, this analogy tends to lead to an unduly con-
servative conception of the nature of morality.
II
At the beginning of his well-known article Two Concepts of Rules,3
John Rawls stresses “the distinction between justifying a practice and
justifying a particular action falling under it”. By “practice” he says he
means “any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines
offices, roles, moves, penalties, defences, and which gives the activity
ds structure. As examples one may think of games and rituals, trials
and parliaments.” Later on the practices of promises and punishment
are introduced as examples of moral practices. It is claimed that under-
standing a particular move within any practice essentially involves ref-
erence to the constitutive rules of that practice and, more importantly
Mr my purpose, that justifying such particular moves is essentially done
b>' referring to the constitutive rules of the practice within which the
m°ve is made. Thus Rawls says that “... when the challenge is to the
Particular action defined by the practice, there is nothing one can do
but refer to the rules”. I understand him to mean by “a particular
3 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, 1955.
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