Íslenskt mál og almenn málfræði - 13.07.1981, Blaðsíða 232

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Páll S. Árdal
like promises in that “only threats are necessarily connected with pro-
ducing expectations”.2 He believes that this can be shown in the follow-
ing way: “If I avowably threaten someone (there being no conventional
way to do so as in promising) but say, ‘I know that you (the hearer) do
not expect me to carry it out or do not fear the threatened action’, it
would seem that my speech act has been defeated — rendered pointless
— just as if I say ‘I promise but don’t intend to’. But in the case of
promising, my speech act is not defeated if I say, ‘I promise, but I know
that you will not rely on my word (perhaps I have disappointed you too
many times in the past)’. What, then, is the point of such an utterance
as a means of communication? The most plausible answer is to say that
the point is merely to bring about the recognition on the part of the
promisee that I am intending my utterance to count as undertaking an
obligation (and hence, perhaps create a corresponding right for him),
which recognition is compatible with my knowing that he doubts that I
intend to do the thing promised. The reason why it is compatible is that
(following Searle in Speech Acts, pp. 62 and 65) in successfully prom-
ising I only take responsibility for doing the promised act, and so only
represent myself as intending to do it, which is compatible with my not
so intending, lest insincere promises would not count as promises.”
Let us first of all remember that we are concerned here with threats
made in language. One may of course threaten in many other ways.
Someone may for example threaten you with an axe without uttering a
single word. Similarly we may hold out a promise to a person by acting
in a certain way that leads him to expect a favourable deed. If we fail
the person in cases of this kind we have not broken a promise, although
the immorality of our failure may derive from the same source, leading
the person to believe you will do him a favour and failing to do so.
It seems to me clearly wrong that there is no conventional way of
making emphatic threats in English. The fact of the matter is that you
do so by saying “I promise you . . .” “Make no mistake about it”,
“that’s not a vain threat”. The point is that “emphasising expressions”,
such as ‘I promise’ give a guarantee whether what is guaranteed is or is
not favourable to the addressee or is meant to be favourable or un-
favourable to him. Normally the nature of what one says one is going
2 Mind Vol. LXXXV, No. 339, p. 328. Robins does not fully state my reasons
for denying that there is a prima facie obligation to keep promises.