Íslenskt mál og almenn málfræði - 13.07.1981, Síða 234

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Páll S. Árdal
to contrast them would completely fail, only if one further condition is
added. A man, in trying to make a promise, says not only “I know you
don’t believe I am going to do x and I know you don’t want x”, but
adds “and I know that x is detrimental to you or does not affect your
interests one way or the other”. This does not seem to me to be a
promise any more than it is a threat if the speaker says “I know you
don’t believe that I am going to do x and that you don’t fear x and
what is more my doing x is in no way detrimental to you or might even
be to your advantage”.
I never meant to claim that promises and threats are entirely com-
parable. Promises are necessarily symbolic or linguistic acts whereas
threats are not. The only threats I was concerned to compare with
promises were threats made by the use of an emphasising expression.
“I promise you never to forget this favour” is a promise whereas “I
promise you never to forget this insult” is a threat. Generally speaking
it is implied here that, given the chance, favourable actions may be
expected from the promiser and unfavourable from the threatener. The
“I promise” locution is there, not to distinguish between promises and
threats, but to give a kind of guarantee, that, if it is a threat, it is no
vain threat and, if it is a promise, it is a promise to be taken seriously.
If there is a doubt as to whether a person means an utterance as an
emphatic threat he can be asked, “Am I to take this as a threat?” The
answer may be “No, I meant it as a promise” for I thought you wanted
what I am committing myself to doing and I also thought it to be for
your benefit. It must not be forgotten that, when an ordinary promise
is broken there is a presumption, not only that the promisee will be
disappointed, but also that he will not be enjoying something he values,
a friend’s company, a good book, a bottle of malt whiskey. The disap-
pointing of a favourable expectation is not the only bad consequence of
a broken promise in cases of this kind. I must also stress that I never
claimed that the same reason can be given for the wrongness of break-
ing all promises and this will become apparent in what follows.
I see no significant difference between threats and promises in
Robins’ correct claim that one may make false promises. One may
clearly also make a false threat. In each case the addressee, and others
who know what was said, have a right to expect that the speaker intends
to do what he promises or threatens to do as the case may be.
By overstressing the formal or “ceremonial” aspects of promises,