Íslenskt mál og almenn málfræði - 13.07.1981, Qupperneq 243

Promises and Games
233
without both taking into account the sensitivities of the promisee and
other considerations that do not seem to have anything in particular to
do with the practice of promises, as established by constitutive rules
analogous to constitutive rules of games. Thus we may think that,
although other relevant circumstances are comparable, we have a
stronger obligation to keep a promise to a stranger than to a friend,
because we think the friend will understand the reasons why we do not
do what we promised, and that this will lessen the force of his disap-
pointment. We may of course take the feelings of an opponent into
account in making a move in chess, but we manifestly do not do this by
referring to the constitutive rules of the game. When we are considering
whether or not to allow our opponent to win, because his feelings may
be hurt, this is much more like considering whether one should perhaps
not play a game at all, rather than to play and annoy one’s wife. The
issue is a purely moral one, and is not in any way to be settled by re-
ference to the rules of the game. The same is true of the so-called
‘promising game’. In settling whether to keep a particular promise, one
always refers beyond the practice to the total situation so that the con-
stitutive rules of promises never settle the issue.
The knowledge promiser and promisee have of each others character
and interests may be relevant in deciding the conditions under which
‘But, you promised’ is justified. A man who is known to be meticulously
careful in his use of language is more likely to mislead those who know
this trait. He should therefore be particularly careful not to make state-
ments of intention that can be construed as promises. He may know
that an “addressee” is a very insecure person who takes ‘being let down’
as a grave insult to him. Giving him the right to believe you mean what
you say as a promise, when you do not, may need to be specially
guarded against. People knowing that you know the addressee’s char-
acter may take an utterance of yours as a promise, although they realise
that most people would not take you to be promising.
In promising, one is arousing favourable expectations in the promisee
and is responsible both for the disappointment that results in case of
failure, and also for depriving him of something he values. This is at
least in many cases, a large part of the reason why it is wrong not to do
'vhat one promises to do. Similarly, when one offers a person to play
him at a certain game like chess, it is understood that one is going to
Play according to the constitutive rules of the game. If one fails to do