Íslenskt mál og almenn málfræði - 13.07.1981, Page 247

Promises and Games 237
content of the statement of intention and the interests of the people
concerned in that content.
To quote him:
(1) Jones uttered the words ‘I hereby promise to pay you Smith, five
dollars.’ From this he moves to
(2) “Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.”
Searle stresses that the conditions for making this move are straight-
forwardly empirical i.e. non-evaluative.—This may be so. The differ-
ence between threats and promises is drawn in terms of the interest of
the promisee in the content of the promise, and whether harm or benefit
to the promisee is intended by the promiser. These conditions can be
discovered by empirical investigation, although sometimes it may be
difficult to decide whether a promise or a threat is being made; what is
meant as a promise may be taken as a threat and vice versa. But con-
sider:
(1) “Jones uttered the words ‘I hereby promise to pay you Smith in
kind for the thrashing you gave me yesterday”
This would entitle you to infer, not only
(2) Jones promised to pay Smith in kind for the thrashing he gave him
yesterday, but also ‘Jones threatened to pay Smith in kind for the
thrashing he gave him yesterday. Jones would be threatening to retaliate
and, although it is perfectly proper to call threats promises, it would be
odd, according to our present normal conceptions of morality, to move
t0 Searle’s next step, which is ‘Jones placed himself under an obligation
to pay Smith in kind for the thrashing he gave him yesterday.’ Since it
Was in terms of the content of the statement and the interests of the
Parties concerned, rather than the formula, that we distinguished threats
from promises, I submit that this is where we should look for the oddity
°f saying that in threatening we are placing ourselves under an obliga-
h°n, whereas this seems less odd in the case of promises.
Now, having placed himself under an obligation, Jones is supposed
to be under an obligation, other things being equal. But, even with a
ceteris paribus clause, it seems odd to claim that a man who threatens
to retaliate is placing himself under an obligation. There is no presump-
ti°n that he is doing this in the first place. Only when there is a pre-
sumption in favour of being obliged to perform an action can it be
aPpropriate to say that we ought to perform it, other things being equal.