Íslenskt mál og almenn málfræði - 13.07.1981, Side 251

Promises and Games
241
(1) It seems to me clear that it is wrong to argue from deathbed prom-
ises to ordinary promises. The fact that a dead person cannot be disap-
pointed by a broken promise does not entail that the disappointment of
the promisee is not an important source of our obligation to keep
ordinary promises. Only if one is wedded to the view that there is
something justifiably called the practice oj promises, or the promising
game, will it seem reasonable to presume absolute homogeneity among
the reasons for our obligation to keep all kinds of promises.
(2) In some cases other people than the promisee may know about the
promise and their disappointment may have to be considered. But even
in the case of a promise privately made to the dying person, there is a
value to be attached to making the person’s last minutes happier by
promising to do what he asks you to do. This value cannot be realised
if death-bed promises are generally ignored, not thought to be binding,
for this is likely to have come to the knowledge of the dying person.
(3) Legal rights are involved in many death-bed promises, such as the
right of a person to dispose of his property at death. A man is not
commonly thought to be justified in using on his deserving son money
he has promised to give to the undeserving son of a dying man, if the
dying man has a right to dispose of the money. But this involves our
obligation to be law-abiding, and may therefore be considered to be
IT>ore binding than ordinary promises. Furthermore, promises involving
money are generally treated as more like contracts than many other
kinds of promises. The reason may be that the monetary system is fairly
clearly laid down; it is much more obviously rule-govemed than prom-
ises to do special favours for people. The more a promise is like a
contract the closer the analogy with games. This may help to explain
why promises to pay debts to businesses seem binding in spite of the
fact that failure to keep the promise may lead to no disappointment.
(4) Let us consider the example of a man giving his father a deathbed
Promise to stop smoking. The old man thought it was wicked, but the
son does not agree. Ought the son to argue the point or make the
Promise with no intention to keep it? One of the reasons why so many
Pcople feel that a lying promise is wrong in these circumstances is, that
the dead are not treated as wholly removed from our moral community,
cven by those who profess no belief in life hereafter. One often hears
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