Helga Law Journal - 01.01.2021, Side 97

Helga Law Journal Vol. 1, 2021
98
Helga Guðmundsdóttir
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commons and instead pave a new path for themselves and other States towards
more sustainable and collegial management of the world’s fish stocks.

recourse to good offices or mediation, or the negotiations presently conducted.81
In short, the procedure provides a much needed avenue for the settlement of the
dispute seeing as the parties may be reluctant to back down from their publicly
claimed stances following years of negotiations between government delegations
which stand to lose support from their home audience if they do not drive a hard
bargain. By following recommendations by an independent third party, based on
fact and law, the government delegations could relieve themselves of some of the
responsibility for negotiating such immense interests, in turn offering them a
chance to devise a durable solution which all parties can agree on without fear of
being held accountable by their home audience for any decreases in quota
allocation. Based on the gradual acceptance of a greater quota share for Iceland
and the Faroe Islands, the gap between the parties may have diminished over the
years and the Commission’s involvement may prove extremely successful to bridge
it and facilitate a durable agreement. Seeing as the Commission is expected to
analyze scientific data and base its recommendations thereon, the agreement will
be aimed towards a more sustainable management of the stock.
In short, the use of this third-party procedure has the potential to lead to a
durable agreement between the parties, safeguarding their interests in the long-
term and leading to a more sustainable approach to the mackerel fisheries. By
subjecting the dispute to compulsory conciliation, the parties could also set a
valuable example for other States to more efficiently resolve the likely unavoidable
fisheries disputes in the future resulting from the changing migration patterns of
fish stock around the world.
5 Conclusion
Finale: The curtain drops. The audience is left in the dark as to whether the protagonists will
resolve the conflict and become the heroes of a story with a happy ending or whether the tragedy
will unfold in the catastrophic destruction of a fish stock.
Where parties to a fisheries dispute have failed to reach a management
agreement by means such as negotiations and the dispute has, over a prolonged
period, resulted in excessive catches, they risk the materialization of the tragedy of
the commons. In such cases, I argue that the parties should subject the dispute to
the largely overlooked compulsory conciliation procedure under the Convention.
That way, they are afforded the opportunity to involve an independent third party
in the resolution of the dispute, allowing them also to give up some of their and
their stakeholders’ self-interests in favour of the common good. I further posit
that the mackerel dispute in the North East Atlantic would be a prime candidate
for this procedure. By subjecting the dispute to compulsory conciliation, the
parties could step away from their path to a catastrophic ending of the tragedy of

81 ‘Annex V Conciliation (V)’ (n 56) 310.