Hugur - 01.01.2014, Qupperneq 167

Réttlæti: Stofnanir og verðskuldun 167
Þorsteinn Gylfason. 1998. Réttlæti og ranglæti. Reykjavík: Heimskringla.
Þorsteinn Gylfason. 1992. Tilraun um heiminn. Reykjavík: Heimskringla.
Abstract
Justice, institutions and desert
The idea that justice consists in people getting what they deserve is often de-
scribed as common sense or as the ordinary idea of justice. This idea, which of-
ten is referred to as justice as desert, has been harshly criticised by contemporary
philosophers such as John Rawls, who says that it has no role to play in a theory
of political or social justice. In discussions of this idea it is not always clear what
people mean by desert or how desert relates to human worth. Moreover, it is not
at all clear how a desert theory of justice applies to children, especially very young
children. The problem here is that desert is often thought to be determined by
what people have achieved but most children have not achieved very much and
babies nothing at all. Does that mean that they don’t deserve anything? Are they
located outside of the realm of justice? Or are there some other principles that
apply in the case of children than in the case of adults? I argue that justice ap-
plies to children in just the same way it applies to adults, and in both cases it is
the future that is relevant rather than the past. This has twofold consequences.
On the one hand, the contrast between justice as desert and justice based on
contract – such as Rawls’ theory – is not as sharp as it is often depicted. On the
other hand, it means that the fundamental issue for social justice is that people
– both children and adults – have fair opportunities to participate in the life of
society in a way that they have a reason to value rather than being rewarded for
their achievements.
Hugur 2014-5.indd 167 19/01/2015 15:09:38