Hugur - 01.06.2008, Blaðsíða 85

Stokkar og steinar Platons
83
Abstract
Plato on Sticks and Stones (and Forms)
The claim that, for anything to be really F, it must invariably appear as F, coupled
with the observation that appearances conflict, features prominently in ancient
philosophy. One way to gain insight into the reason for its prominence and hence
apparent force is by eliciting a tacit assumption and construing the claim as a set
of two distinct claims. First, for anything to be reafly F, it must be knowable as F.
This claim is intelflgible given the connection assumed between the real and the
knowable. Then, the claim that, for anything to be knowable as F, it must invari-
ably appear as F, shows up the difficulty of setting down criteria for knowability
other than invariability.
Both claims feature in Plato’s conception of the Forms. There are two kinds
of entities, ordinary objects of experience and Forms. In the Phaedo Plato argues
that Forms are distinct from ordinary objects of experience in that, since we
experience the two differently, our epistemic access to them is different; we know
that the equal itself is equal, but not that sensible equals are equal. He argues for
this claim by appealing to appearances, namely that sensible equals variously ap-
pear equal and unequal, while the equal itself invariably appears equal. (Since it is
controversial whether Plato does appeal in this way to appearances, both textual
and philosophical justifications are offered.) Thus Plato conceives of the Forms,
as distinct from sensibles, in terms of the invariability of their appearances, which
guarantees their knowability. Support is found for this reading in central passages
from the Hippias major and the Republic V.