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Abstract
Subjectivity without Relativity
A subjective property, ontologically speaking, is one whose instantiation is mind-
dependent in some relevant sense in which the instantiation of an objective prop-
erty is not. It has been argued that if a property is subjective, disagreement about
it can be faultless. This means that two people can disagree about whether an
object has the property, yet both be right. The possibility of faultless disagree-
ment seems to rest upon a (restricted) version of truth relativism. I.e. in order
for disagreement about facts of type T to be faultless, such as facts about things
we attribute to personal taste, the truth about facts of type T must be relative to
something like a context of evaluation.
Those rejecting the possibility of faultless disagreement include indexical
relativists, or semantic contextualists. On their account, the semantic value of
predicates such as taste predicates is relative to a user or a context of use. The
result is that two speakers who appear to disagree about such facts do not really
disagree; hence there is no application for faultless disagreement. I argue that the
possibility of faultless disagreement is not a necessary precondition for subjective
properties and that semantic contextualism and the kind of relativism required
for faultless disagreement are equally equipped when it comes to accounting for
subjective properties.