Le Nord : revue internationale des Pays de Nord - 01.06.1938, Blaðsíða 399

CHRONIQUE TRIMESTRIELLE
3 89
At the begin-
ning of Novem-
ber Mr. Sand-
ler, the Foreign
Minister, gave,
before a milita-
ry society, an
exposé of Swe-
den’s position during and after the
European crisis and the Munich
agreement. Were we not then, he
said, in reality thrown back to the
system of conference of ambassa-
dors after twenty years of work by
the League of Nations? Although
with the difference in its composi-
tion, due to the rapid post-war
development of Germany’s power,
that in this modern edition those
who then lost the war were now
sitting together with those who lost
the peace.
In small countries, he continued,
the reaction after Munich might
perhaps have taken the form of a
modernized “what is the use?“
propaganda. It was rather obvious
to ask what was the use of much
smaller military forces than those
of Czechoslovakia if the peace po-
licy of Great Powers compels a
country to give up every attempt at
utilizing her own military resources.
The unison armaments chorus
which accompanied the peace opus
of the four Great Soloists had,
however, silenced every such at-
tempt. Stiffer breezes were notice-
able even amongst the most peace-
loving of nations and a more deter-
mined desire to rely upon oneself.
From the point of view of power
policy the transformation that had
now taken place in Europe was a
far more sweeping one than a mere
settlement of a German, a Magyar
and a Polish minority question in
Central Europe. The entire system
of alliances which derived from the
spirit of Versailles now lay in ruins.
Those States which were untram-
melled by alliances were able to
feel less perturbed than others. It
really remained to be seen whether
the change in political power on the
Continent of Europe would be li-
mited to the already tangible re-
sults. The dynamic effects which
had found expression in the com-
plete re-orientation of the new Cze-
choslovak-Ruthenian Federal State,
in the Polish activity which in it-
self limits the implication of a Nor-
dic-PoIish parallelism, in the more
plastic state of affairs which is no-
ticeable in the zone between the
Baltic and the Black Sea, exhort us
to be temperate in all our predic-
tions.
We, like everybody else, the mi-
nister said, have to try to realize
this new state of affairs, and, just
as well now as later, see how we
stand ourselves. For it is not that
of others, but our own policy we
have to manage. Let us therefore
now see what Sweden had been do-
ing during the crisis and how we
shall orientate ourselves in the si-
tuation that has been created.
Our country’s part during the
actual crisis was a passive one. All
2G*
SWEDEN