Hugur - 01.01.2018, Síða 51

Til varnar hugsmíðahyggju 51
Þorsteinn Gylfason. 2005. Innlit hjá Kant: Um Gagnrýni hreinnar skynsemi, eftir
Immanuel Kant. Reykjavík: Háskólaútgáfan og Heimspekistofnun.
Abstract
In defence of constructivism: A comment on the philosophical foundations
of qualitative research
A number of publications on the methodology of the social sciences set forth
and discuss statements to the effect that qualitative research requires commit-
ment to constructivism that is incompatible with the existence of objective reality
and objective knowledge. I argue that these statements should be rejected and
that researchers can, and should, avail themselves of the true and useful insights
enshrined in constructivism without any commitments to more contestable phi-
lo sophical theories.
In my paper I use the following definitions:
i. Metaphysical constructivism about a type of entities is the view that
such entities are what they are because of what people think or say.
ii. Epistemological constructivism is the view that our knowledge
is composed of elements – such as concepts, statements, and the-
ories – that are the way they are because of convention or because of
something that people think or say.
As “constructivism” is used to designate a great variety of metaphysical and ep-
istemological views, I do not claim that my arguments apply to all philosophical
stances described by this term. Granted, however, my two definitions there are
good reasons to accept both metaphysical and epistemological constructivism
and the two following theses:
a) Metaphysical constructivism about social reality is independent of
metaphysical theories, such as materialism and idealism, about the
ultimate nature of all reality.
b) Epistemological constructivism does not entail subjectivism or
relativism.
Hugur 2018meðoverride.indd 51 24-Jul-18 12:21:23