Hugur - 01.06.2010, Qupperneq 169

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167
The human subject is the centrepiece of this epistemological idea which rests
on the metaphysical foundation of a human’s ability to understand and produce
knowledge. René Descartes is without a doubt the most influential character
and has had a profound influence on his followers as well as on the history of
Western philosophy ever since. Malebranche, Arnauld, Pascal, Spinoza, Leibniz
and (very seldom mentioned) Margaret Cavendish, Mary Astell, Elisabeth of
the Palatine and Damaris Cudworth Masham dedicated themselves to either
extending or correcting his ideas. Descartes described the thinking subject, the
cogito, and turned philosophy to the subject. His idea of reason was founded on
soul and body dualism where the soul is the source of true knowledge (thought
without extension).
In this paper I focus on the letters of two 17* century women philosophers:
Elisabeth of the Palatine and Damaris Cudworth Masham. Elisabeth’s and
Damaris Masham’s implicit critique concerns the very foundations of Cartesian
philosophy - the combination of thought and extension. The critique of “that
simple being, cafled soul” is put forth in the letters. The discourses, questions,
and answers of the women show how they write on the premises of the tradition
while resisting it; how they see contradictions and criticize by taking examples of
themselves, their female experience, and “female weaknesses”. The letters reflect
on how they respond to the knowing subject of philosophy as well as constructing
their own self. In a feminist reading of these philosophical ideas, I suggest that
their letters create new perspectives on the construction of Descartes’ knowing
subject and the sexed self/subject, and consider whether we could say that Elisa-
beth and Damaris Masham are the foremothers of modern feminist philosophers
who criticize the soul/body dualism and state that women’s knowledge is based
on embodied and passionate thought.