Hugur - 01.01.2015, Síða 122

122 Atli Harðarson
Abstract
Rational Self-Control
For ordinary humans self-control often fails: Sometimes people quarrel when
they intend to have good time together; students sleep in although they want to
get up early and read for an exam; in spite of intentions to the contrary smokers
fail to quit smoking; good people want to forgive but can’t get rid of angry
thoughts. We have all sorts of plans that do not succeed because our minds are
restive and ungovernable.
In my paper I analyse the concept of rational self-control and argue that an
agent, A, has rational self-control if and only if all the following four conditions
hold:
i. A’s belief about what is the best course of action is determined by
available knowledge, i.e. by what A has strong overall reason to do.
ii. If A has made a decision or formed an intention or resolution it
is determined by A’s belief about what is the best course of action
iii. If A’s action is determined by a desire, that desire is determined
by what A intends, decides or resolves, provided A has made a
decision or formed an intention or resolution, else by A’s belief
about what is the best course of action.
iv. A’s action is determined by what A believes is the best course of
action or by what A intends, resolves or decides to do or by what
A desires.
Drawing upon recent work by Richard Holton, Alfred Mele and Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, I argue that corresponding to these four conditions there are four
different ways in which rational self-control can fail.
My analysis has bearing on fundamental ethical questions about moral virtues
and responsibility. It is also relevant to recent psychological work on the interplay
of trait self-control, as defined by Walter Mischel, and what Roy F. Baumeister
et al. describe as ego-depletion. A conceptual distinction between different types
of self-control failures is needed to account for empirical results to the effect
that those who score high on tests of trait self-control sometimes do not exhibit
the type of willpower defined by the ego-depletion model. Furthermore, I also
point out that my analysis can be used to clarify and categorize different the-
ories of addiction and substance dependence, where some authorities, e.g. George
Ainslie, locate the addict’s failure at ii others, e.g. Timothy Schroeder, focus on iv.
Arguably, the distinctions I draw are needed as a preliminary to combining the
important insights provided by these two approaches.
Hugur 2015-5.indd 122 5/10/2016 6:45:29 AM