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162 Finnur Dellsén
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Abstract
From Belief to Credence and Back Again: An Overview of Bayesian
Epistemology
This paper discusses the delicate relationship between traditional epistemology
and the increasingly influential probabilistic (or ‘Bayesian’) approach to epistem-
ology. The paper introduces some of the key ideas of probabilistic epistemology,
including credences (degrees of belief ), Bayes’ theorem, conditionalization,
and Dutch Book arguments. The tension between traditional and probabilistic
epistem ology is brought out by considering the lottery and preface para doxes
as they relate to rational (binary) belief and credence respectively. It is then
arg ue d that this tension can be alleviated by rejecting the requirement that
rational (binary) beliefs must be consistent and closed under logical entailment.
Instead, it is suggested that the requirements of consistency and closure apply to
a different type of binary propositional attitude, viz. acceptance.
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