Hugur - 01.01.2016, Qupperneq 50

50 Jón Ásgeir Kalmansson
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1971. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. Philosophical Investigations. Þýð. G. E. M. Anscombe.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1984. Culture and Value. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Abstract
A Wholistic vision
In this article I discuss a distinction between two concepts of the understanding:
A concept of an analytical understanding, sometimes referred to by the latin ratio,
and a concept of a ”wholistic“ vision or understanding – or the latin intellect-
us. My main question is what this latter kind of understanding involves and
what light it can trow on the nature of ethical thought. I approach the question
first by considering some of Ludwig‘s Wittgensteins ideas on aspect-seeing in
the Philosophical Investigations. Noticing an aspect, according to Wittgenstein,
is neither a question of seeing or thinking but an amalgam of both. Thus, for
example, seeing something as something involves adopting an attitude towards
it. I relate this aspect of Wittgenstein‘s thinking to his discussion in “A Lect-
ure on Ethics” on the importance of wonder in ethical thought. I argue that
wonder can be understood as an example of aspect-seeing which manifests an
attitude towards the world as a whole. Next I put these ideas in context with the
classical notion of wonder as the beginning and principle of philosophy. Wonder,
traditionally undirstood, reveals some aspect of reality that is in excess of normal
human abilities to understand – i.e. some kind of mystery – and I explore differ-
ent senses of such an excess. In the final part of the essay I discuss the relationship
between wonder, mystery and ethics and argue that we need to pay much greater
attention to our understanding of the world and our life as a whole.
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